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Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules:
Theory and Evidence
Summary
This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In
order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into
account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical
structure and its technology. I employ electricity data from the U.S. electric power
market to test the model’s predictions. The evidence shows that reforms from low
powered incentive scheme (COS) to high powered one (PBR) are linked to high cost
industries, the presence of elected supervisors, high inter-party platform distance and
large (slim) majority when the reformer is Republican (Democratic). Moreover, there is
some evidence in the data that performance-based regulation lowers regulated prices.
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A Francesco e Pierluigi con Amore e Profondo Rispetto.

1. Introduction
A major task of economics is to explain the pattern of government intervention in
industries that is to say industrial policy. An idealized, but illuminating, view of
regulatory institutions is that they result from a broadly defined constitution
drafted by some benevolent “founders” behind a veil of ignorance.1 This “public
interest” research program derives policies able to correct market failures such as
monopoly pricing. In the last twenty years this paradigm has been substantially
improved by explicitly considering informational asymmetries. Industrial policy
can be thought as resulting from the optimal trade-off between efficiency
enhancement and rent extraction and, indeed, in regulating a natural monopoly,
the planner will select optimal cost-reimbursement rules, which arbitrate
differently between cost reducement effort (i.e.: moral hazard with risk neutral
firm) and informational rents (i.e.: adverse selection). Price-cap favors efficiency,
while cost-plus regulation (COS) favors rent extraction. However, the public
interest approach completely fails in taking into consideration both the watchdog
role of consumers’ (i.e.: residential and industrial) interest groups and the delicate
set of controls on bureaucrats and politicians. Indeed, judges have discretionary
power and compete with executive branches and regulators in filling in
unforeseen contingencies (see Shapiro [1986], Spiller and Tiller [1999] and
1

These social “planners” must delegate actual social choices to other agents (i.e., “public decision

makers”) and they possibly design a set of institutions or rules of the game inducing these public
decision makers to behave as if their respective assessments of welfare coincided.
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Guerriero [2006 a]). Moreover, politicians may favor special interest groups (see
the Chicago tradition in Peltzman [1976] and Becker [1985]) leaving conspicuous
rents to the officials involved in regulation (see Niskanen [1971] and Wilson
[1980]). The recent New Theory of Regulation approach has tried to overcome
such an inconsistency, employing both the classical principal-agent model and the
growing political economy literature. Two are the main merits of this program: 1.
the explicit design of the political system details and of the positive forces driving
public intervention; 2. the crucial role entrusted to private information in giving
rent seeking incentives to regulated firms’ interest group and signal extraction
foundations to the hierarchical structure of real world regulatory institutions.
When explicit contracts on observable efforts or performances are available for
supervisors, the low type quantity-effort allocation is distorted even more to take
into account the possible capture and the institutional design of the supervision
hierarchy (Laffont and Tirole [1993] and Laffont and Martimort [1999]), and the
planner’s partisan interests (Laffont [1996] and [2000]). In such a collusion-proof
equilibrium (i.e. in which capture does not prevail), costly incentive payments are
given to non-benevolent regulators for a value equal to the maximum expected
collusion offer, which is the firm’s expected stake (i.e. high type rent). However
this set up basically fails in capturing real world institutions. Regulators and
judges are implicitly motivated by simple election-appointment rules. Moreover
the review processes’ structure makes difficult to swallow the hypothesis that the
real role of these officials is one of decision making. Only recently, Guerriero
[2006, a] has given a first complete and realistic description of this complex
agency structure. A hierarchical rate review process makes crucial the generosity
of settlement if judges are interested in leaving a legacy of correctness (“legacy

3
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effect”). This is more likely when regulators are not willing to exert costly effort
because they are concerned with obtaining job offers from the industry (i.e.:
“revolving door effect”); election magnifies these incentives. A possibly partisan
(i.e., interested in the long run profitability of the industry) planner will take into
consideration the effectiveness of the signal extraction technology and the
accountability power of different selection rules in designing the regulatory
institutions. This paper brings two main contributions: 1. It broadens the scope of
the Guerriero [2006 a]’s model to the optimal selection of incentive schemes; 2. It
empirically evaluates the merit of this new cost-reimbursement selection theory
facing it with electricity data. My focus is the economics of regulation but the
idea is wider and applies to a rich set of market, fiscal and monetary institutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates
the institutions of the US electric power market. Next, Section 3 explains the
model clarifying the efficiency driven and strategic determinants of incentive
schemes. Section 4 tests this theory, taking into consideration the introduction of
performance based regulations (PBR) in the US electricity market during the 80s
and 90s; besides, an analysis of the effects of these reforms on the sectorregulated prices is provided. Section 5 discusses the significance of the paper’s
findings and proposes an agenda for future research. Tables, proofs and a detailed
description of the data are contained in the Appendix.

2. Institutions
Investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) account for over three-fourths of the
electricity sales and revenues of the U. S. electric power market. Jurisdiction over

4
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both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies inside a federal body
(FERC); retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs),
which deal with several utilities (i.e., natural gas, telecommunications, water and
wastewater, insurance, trucking and railroad) and perform a broad range of tasks
(e.g. they suggest lines of conduct on services provision, avoid by-passing by non
regulated utilities, they rule on environmental issues and so forth) among which
the most important is the regulation of prices.2 Regulated utilities are not allowed
to receive governmental subsides and their revenue must cover their cost
(including managerial rewards). IOUs usually charge a two-part tariff,3 triggering
rate reviews in response to rising costs (Joskow, [1974]). Even if a docket can be
entrusted directly to a commissioner or to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
almost all the files are evaluated within formal meetings open to all the interested
parties (firms, ratepayers, lawyers of the Attorney General’s Office and so forth).
In the first instance, commissioners sit on the bench during sessions and consumer
advocates4 represent ratepayers. If the proposed filing is not approved, a formal
quasi-judicial hearing, presided by one or more ALJs, is opened. Next, the quasijudicial tribunal takes a qualified majority enforceable judgment. PUCs may
review the case, provided that the onus of injustice and illegality of the decision
2

Here I follow the descriptions contained in the 1992 and 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado

PUC and on the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) official website.
3

As Joskow and Schmalensee [1986] suggest the fixed premium paid by consumer turns out to

assume the some role of the governmental transfer typical of the regulation-procurement literature.
As a consequence, I will replace the economic shadow cost of public funds with the marginal
deadweight loss associated with an increase in the fixed premium.
4

Consumer advocates are state funded independent bodies established during the 70s and 80s in

the face of steeply rising rates in order to allow even residential users to proceed before PUCs.
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lies on the firm. Finally, utilities can also appeal to High Courts on formal issues.
These two last appeal levels are rarely granted. Within the hearings, the role of
commissioners and ALJs is one of supervision: they examine witnesses and
experts, receive the evidence and interpret precedents and regulations. The final
motion to be approved is proposed by the PUC’s staff. During the process, this
body is divided in a “trial” and in an “advisory” team. While the latter reviews the
case formulating a staff position in all equated to the one of any other interested
party; the former advices regulators and judges on technical and policy issues,
proposing de facto the motion. The complete record of the hearings and the
participation of all parties assure that the PUC’s staff uses only “hard” evidence.
This is a by-product of the “adversary” scope of the hearings: no evidence can be
denied once the precedent is individuated. Thus, the design of incentive schemes
can be modeled through the following version of the Guerriero [2006, a]’s model.

3. Theory
The regulated firm produces a variable scale product q and charges a two part
tariff A + pq for q > 0, where A and p are positive. It can refuse to produce if the
contract offered by the principal does not guarantee a minimum level of expected
utility, that I will normalize at a reservation level of 0. Both the firm and the
supervisors are risk neutral with respect to income. Total cost is C = (β – a)q + υ
and a represents the manager’s effort, while β is an inefficiency parameter, which
turns out to be equal to β with probability v and to β with probability 1 – v; with
∆β ≡ β – β . Assuming that the fixed cost is known, and normalizing it at zero (υ
= 0) it is possible to denote marginal cost as c ≡ β – a. Regulation is subject to

6
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both adverse selection (as captured by β) and moral hazard (as captured by a). Let
assume that effort remains strictly positive over the relevant range of equilibrium
production. If the manager exerts effort level a, she decreases the monetary
marginal cost of output by a, and incurs in a disutility (in monetary units) of ψ(a).
This disutility is increasing and convex in a (i.e.: ψ ′>0; ψ ′′>0); moreover the
following hold: ψ(0) = 0, lima →β ψ(a) = + ∞ and ψ ′′′>0.5 All consumers have the
same preferences; thus, the demand is the one of a representative consumer with
gross consumer surplus given by S(⋅). The inverse and regular demand functions
and the firm’s revenue are given by p = P(q) = S ′(q), q = D(p), R(q) = P(q)q + A
respectively. Consumers choose q as to maximize net surplus S(⋅) – A – pq and A
is chosen optimally so as to make her indifferent between buying and not buying
the good i.e., A ≡ S(q) – P(q)q. Firm’s revenues must cover both average costs
and managerial compensation t; moreover the firm can refuse to produce if a level
of expected utility U weakly greater than the reservation level of 0 is not
guaranteed. As a result, I have that A + (p – c)q(p) ≥ t and U = t – ψ(a) ≥ 0.
Let denote the social surplus obtained by the production of q as V(q) with V(0) =
0, V ′ > 0, and V ′′< 0. V(q) is the sum of consumers’ net surplus plus the firm’s
revenue evaluated at the shadow price of managerial reward. V(q) rewrites as:
V(q) = (S(q) – R(q)) + (1+λ)R(q) = S(q) +λR(q) = (1+λ)S(q).
The planner’s objective function, labeled with subscript P, is:

WP = S(q(p)) – A – pq(p) + (1+λ) [A + (p – c) q(p) – t] + U =
= V(q) – (1+λ)[(β – a)q+ψ(a)] – λU
5

(1)

This is a sufficient condition for the regulator’s optimization programs to be concave and for the

optimal incentive schemes to be deterministic.
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Here, 1 + λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the firm’s budget constraint;
note that, in contrast to the program with governmental transfers, λ depends on
both c and t. Under complete information,6 the planner implements the first best
allocation leaving no rent to the firm with a simple “fixed price” (or a cost target)
contract (see Appendix 6.1 for details). Instead, under asymmetric information,
the planner observes only total cost and output7 and not a: as a result, β is now
private information of the firm. Label equilibrium rewards, outputs, average and
marginal costs and utilities for the two types as:

{( t , q, C , c ,U , a ) , ( t , q , C , c ,U , a )}.

A contract based on the observables t and C specifies a reward-cost pair for each
type. As usual, the program envisions a solution with binding low (inefficient)
type’s individual rationality and high type’s incentive compatibility constraints:
U = t −ψ (β − c ) = 0

(IR_L)

U = t −ψ ( β − c ) = U + ψ ( β − c ) −ψ ( β − c ) = Φ (a )

(IC_H)

where Φ(·) is an increasing function defined as Φ ( a ) ≡ ψ ( a ) − ψ ( a − ∆ β ) .8 Such
a solution entails an efficient level of effort and a positive informational rent U
for the high type and under-effort and no rent for the low type. Now suppose that
the planner can relax the informational asymmetry by employing a hierarchy of
6

Realized costs, outputs and prices are verifiable. The planner knows β and acts as a Stackelberg

leader making take-or-live it offers on the observable a.
7

With a linear technology, the planner observes average costs, which are equal to marginal cost.

With know fixed cost υ, she observes (C – υ)/q = β – a and the analysis goes on unchanged.
8

Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for type β ( β ) is the one preferred

by type β ( β ) in the menu of managerial rewards-cost pairs. This amounts to say that:
t −ψ ( β − c ) ≥ t −ψ ( β − c )

(IC_H)

and

t −ψ ( β − c ) ≥ t −ψ ( β − c )

(IC_L).

8
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two supervisors (i.e. a regulator and a judge) designed exactly as the market
described in the institutional analysis. The question is the following: is it possible
to assess the ex post normative qualities of the incentive schemes selected by a
possibly partisan planner? As the following theory will make clear, the success of
the regulatory regime design is sensible to efficiency and political dimensions. I
will first treat the former underlining the main similarity with the model of
Laffont and Tirole [1993], leaving the positive side of the issue to the next
subsection. There I will compare the results with the seminal work of Laffont
[1996]. The following analysis strictly tracks the approach of Guerriero [2006, a].
Supervisors can, exerting costly effort, tailor the supervision activity to the
specific docket (i.e., they choose the number and quality of the experts, the firms’
official papers to be examined and so forth). The equilibrium level of effort and
the supervisors’ random ability (e.g., ability to examine experts given precedents
and prevailing regulations) determine the precision of the planner’s signal. As
explained above, the report is effectively delivered by the PUC’s staff, so I simply
assume that the planner has directly at her disposal this benevolent information
device.9 Moreover, given that in our market PUCs’ rules and conducts prohibit
communication between supervisors, no side contract is allowed between these
players. Once one of the two docket’s filing steps is set up, the planner receives a
signal σ = { β ; φ } about the cost structure with precision ξ, determined by the

supervisors’ activity. This signal can only inform about β . The information is

hard, i.e. it is verifiable (in the sense that every interested party can convince

9

Note that, besides the constraints imposed by the adversary process structure, explicit incentives

can be designed for the staff members, who are not implicitly motivated by an appointment rule.

9
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himself that the signal corresponds to the true state of the world). If β = β with

probability ξ the planner sees σ = β and implements the complete information

contract and with probability 1 – ξ she observes σ = φ . If β = β , then σ = φ

always.10 When σ = φ , the planner is uninformed, and she updates her beliefs
applying Bayes’s rule. Supervisors are evaluated according to the performance ξ
∈ [0, 1], which is described by the process’ records and has a technology given

by ξ = αe + e. Effort takes value on (0, ξ u /(1 + α)] with ξ u to be defined below.
The effort cost function can be written as C (i) = C (i)(1 − K ) where K measures the


effectiveness of the signal extraction technology and is increasing in the PUC’s
funds and in the watchdog groups’ ability to provide hard information. Besides, I
have that: C e > 0 , C ee > 0 , C (0) = 0 and limU Ce = ∞ (with 0 < ξ u < 1), i.e. the full
e →ξ

precision case is ruled out. Clearly, it is not possible to obtain a perfect signal
through effort only. The random ability α has support (0, 1) and a natural choice
is to have α ~ Beta (g, b) with density fy(y; g, b) = [yg–1(1 – y)b–1]/B(g, b) and B(g,
1

b) = ∫ y g −1 (1 − y )b −1 dy - Beta function. The mean is α = g/(g + b). If g = b = 1, I
0
obtain a uniform distribution on (0, 1): from a Bayesian point of view this
corresponds to the case of uninformative prior on the supervisor ability. The only
restrictions I impose on g and b is that the distribution is symmetric (g = b) and
hump-shaped (informative): g > 1 and b > 1. Note how α and e assume the
meaning of overall measures i.e.: they take into account the different judges’ and
regulators’ abilities. The first best arises either for e or ξ verifiable and
10

This technology simplifies the notation and has the appealing feature that the agent can provide

verifiable information only when the proof is possible, i.e., β -case (see also Laffont [2000]).

10
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contractible: “selling the store” contracts reach efficiency. However, the
assumption that the planner can write unrestricted contingent contracts with the
supervisors does not fit in any way reality and so I assume that ξ is always
observable but not contractible. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Society (planner, firm, regulator and judge if addressed; see stage 3 and 4
below) learns the nature of the regulatory environment: P(q) and that β ∈ {β , β } .
Next the firm discovers the only piece of private information: β.

2. The planner offers a menu of managerial reward-cost pairs to the firm
contingent to the realization of the signal obtained through the hearing process.
Moreover, an exogenously given wage ŝ , set a reservation level (for sake of
simplicity assumed equal for both), is given to the two supervisors.

3. The regulator chooses the level of effort; next she discovers her random ability
and, at last, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best
is implemented; otherwise a hearing is open and the judge enters the game.

4. Step 3 is repeated for the judge. If the signal is again uninformative, the planner
asks for a report to the firm and the asymmetric information regime arises.

5. Last a reward-quantity pair is implemented and evaluators make their move.11
In order to understand the incentives faced by the supervisors as a function of the
selection rules and the nature of the task, note that two are the dimensions of
heterogeneity: regulators vs. judges and appointed vs. elected officials. I capture
the latter referring to the set up developed in Alesina and Tabellini [2005, a]. A
supervisor receives a payment ŝ and she has a utility function given by:

11

For an elected supervisor the evaluator will be a rational electorate. Note how also ALJs are

elected in the US. The evaluator of appointed supervisors is the industry or a selection committee.

11
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{

}

Ri ,l (ei ,l , S ) = 1 + τ (1 − SR)G i (ei ,l ) − (1 − (1 − S ) J )C (ei ,l )  sˆ

(2)

Here, the parameter τ measures the strength of the career concern incentives. For
sake of comparison I will exhibit the case of equal draw of α and denote with i =
{Appointed, Elected} and l = {Regulator, Judge}. In (2), S will be equal to 1 for a
regulator and 0 for a judge while G i ( ei ,l ) differentiates bureaucrats and politicians.
A politician’s goal is to be re-elected and this happens if ξ exceeds a threshold ξ .

This amounts to say that G E ( eE ,l ) = Pr {ξ ≥ ξ } . Voters are rational and understand
that the alternative to the incumbent is another politician with average talent who

{

}

will exert effort ξ = (3 / 2)eEexp,l . So I have that: G E ( eE ,l ) = Pr α ≥ ( 3eEexp,l / 2eE ,l ) − 1 . On



the other hand, a bureaucrat is career concerned and she wants to maximize the
perception of her ability α given the realization of the relevant measure of
performance ξ, i.e., G A ( eA,l ) = E ( E (α ξ A,l ) ) = E {(1 + α ) eA,l − eAexp,l  / eAexp,l } . Here, E(·) is

the evaluator’s expectation over α given the precision realization and E denotes
the unconditional expectation over ξ. A glance at G E ( i ) and G A ( i ) reveals how
elected supervisors will exert more effort than appointed one. This is due to the
fact that the density of the Beta evaluated at the mean is always greater than 1 for
all g and b greater than 1. The relevant inequality is fα( α ) > 1. This result is not
upset when the distribution of α is asymmetric.12 Focusing on R and J, they are
both defined on (0, 1) and represent regulators and judges specific parameters.
The first one captures the so-called “revolving-door” effect: regulators can be
attracted by future job opportunities in the regulated industry. The second one (J)
12

Proofs are available upon request. A local result holds if the substitutability between e and α is

imperfect: ξ = (α + Z)e. Here, I need: [Z + g/(g+b)] fα( α ) > [1 + Zg/(g+b)].

12
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reveals the judges’ desire to leave a legacy of correctness and unbiasedness (see
also Levy [2005]).13 Clearly enough the equilibrium level of effort can be ranked
as follows: eˆES , J > eˆAS , J and eˆES , R > eˆAS , R (see Guerriero [2006 a] for proofs). Moreover
these levels will be greater the more effective is the supervision technology K. In

2., the planner foresees the supervisors’ moves and offers to the firm a menu of
contracts contingent on the eventual signals {σR, σJ} and fully characterized by
the above equilibrium levels of effort. The planner’s posterior beliefs on β = β is:
Pr( β = β / σ R = φ , σ J = φ ) =

v (1 − {E[ξ iS, R (eˆiS, R )] + (1 − E[ξ iS, R (eˆiS, R )]) E[ξ iS, J (eˆiS, J )]}) v (1 − γ (eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J )) .
=
1 − v{E[ξiS, R (eˆiS, R )] + (1 − E[ξ iS, R (eˆiS, R )]) E[ξ iS, J (eˆiS, J )]}
1 − vγ (eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J )

where γ (eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J ) is greater the higher is K and if supervisors are elected. Now, the
planner’s ex-post expected welfare function writes as follows:

(

(
(

 v 1 − γ eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J

WPAI , S = vγ eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J W * + 1 − vγ eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J  
S
S
 1 − vγ eˆi , R , eˆi , J

(

(

)

+ψ (aˆ S )  − λΦ(aˆ S )  +

)

))  ˆ
V (q
) 

S

) − (1 + λ ) ( β − aˆ S )qˆ S +


1− v
V (qˆ S ) − (1 + λ ) ( β − aˆ S )qˆ S +ψ (aˆ S )    − 2(1 + µ ) sˆ (3)
S
S



1 − vγ eˆi , R , eˆi , J 


(

)

where µ is the shadow cost of public funds. Again the high type agent obtains an
optimal allocation while the allocation-effort pair for the low type is given by:
qˆ

S

i.e., V ′ ( qˆ

= q * ( β − aˆ S )

ψ ′ ( aˆ

S

) = qˆ

S

−

λ

S

) = cˆ

S

(

= β − aˆ

v
1 − γ ( eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J
1+ λ 1− v

S

) ) Φ ′( aˆ

,

S

),

(4)

The results in (4) suggest how the rule giving price as a function of marginal cost
is the same of the full information case: incentive concerns are entirely taken care
of by the cost-reimbursement rule. In order to lower the high type rent, the
principal is forced to distort away from the first best allocations and toward low
13

The revolving door effect does not seem to exist for ALJs.
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power (i.e., low level of effort aˆ S ) incentive schemes. This distortion is lower the
more powerful is the signal extraction technology and implicit political incentives
(election) for supervisors act here as substitute for possibly costly explicit market
incentives (COS). The following proposition summarizes these findings:

Proposition 1: A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to the presence of
elected supervisors and more efficient supervision technologies (higher K). B. An
increase in the power of the incentive scheme lowers ex-ante regulated prices.
The above proposition extends the basic insights of the New Regulation Theory
program’s (Laffont and Tirole [1993]) to the more realistic framework with
implicitly interested supervisors and hierarchical signal extraction technology.
However, it is instructive to insist that the picture drawn in this section is at least
partially shaded. I always assume a myopic and public interested planner, but
what happens when partisan interests and concerns for the long run firm’s
profitability affect the planner’s objective function?

3.1 Strategic Price Mechanism Reforms
Following Laffont and Tirole [1993], a sharp tension between rent extraction and
investment arises in industrial policies: whether or not the planner can commit to
a contract contingent on the level of investment, the equilibrium can envision ex
post expropriation of sank investments. In this sense, non-benevolent supervisors
may relax such a failure. This intuition proposes several crucial questions: is it
possible to think of the supervisors’ effort exertion as a pandering activity? If this
is the case, can a possibly partisan planner take the expropriation effect into
consideration in choosing among selection rules? How much is this choice driven
by efficiency concerns and how strong are the rent seeking forces? The answer to
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the first question arises naturally when the above model is bridged to the analysis
in Laffont and Tirole [1993]. Let me assume that before stage 1. The regulated
firm fixes the level of a non contractible investment of cost I that increases of ζ(I)
the probability that a high type is drawn. Moreover I have that: ζ ′(i) > 0, ζ ′′(i) < 0 ,
lim I = ∞ with v = (1 − v ) / v and that investments are sufficiently effective, i.e.

I →ζ −1 ( v )

ζ ′(i) > 1 (v∆θ ) . The planner lacks commitment but anticipates the optimal I (i.e.,
I*). Ex ante the firm maximizes her expected ex post rent minus investment costs:

{

I * ∈ arg max I ≥ 0 v(1 + ζ ( I ))[1 − γ (eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J )]Φ ( aˆ S , I ( I * )) − I

}

(5)

Employing a revealed preference argument (see Appendix 6.1), (5) clarifies that
the firm under-invests with respect to the social optimum. Moreover, the objective
function in (5) suggests that the extent of inefficiency is higher the more precise is
the planner’s signal and the less powered the incentive scheme is.14 Indeed, a
fixed-price contract reaches efficiency but at the cost of a too high rent for the
high type. It is now clear how a planner caring enough about cost-reducing
investments, because faced with a high cost market or because strongly interested
in the firm long run profits will prefer a high-powered performance rule. From a
long run perspective, the supervisors’ signal extraction activity can assume a
pandering feature when effort is driven more by career concerns than by a
farsighted interest in the market efficiency: this dynamic inconsistency is even
stronger when investments in reliability and quality services are taken into

14

Such an effect is studied in Sappington [1986]. Here, an institution that prevents a regulator

from observing the firm’s true cost turns out to be optimal to protect the firm from investments’
expropriation. In my model the actual presence of higher powered incentives schemes and the
appointment rule for supervisors cover the same role.
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consideration. These activities do not lower the firm’s cost but increase her long
run profitability: evidently also a conflict between consumers’ groups will arise
here. To capture this, I assume that the constitutional reform is decided by the
incumbent among two parties: one more pro-shareholders R (Republican), and
one more pro-consumers D (Democratic). Between stages 1. and 2., each party
faces an election with winning probability xj (j = [D, R]) and decides, if it is the
winner, the size of ρj, an instrument increasing the investment’s utility for the
firm, i.e. G ( I , ρˆ j ) . A type j planner attaches a weight χ J to the latter and a weight

χj to I. The weights are such that: χ R = 1 + 2 d , χ D = 1 + d , χ R = 2 d − 1 , χ R = d − 1 .
So a Republican planner values more I and dislikes less an increase in the firm’s
utility. The following properties hold: G1 > 0, G11 < 0 , G11 < 0, G2 > 0, G22 < 0, G12 > 0 ,
G21 > 0 . The firm shows risk aversion toward non cost-reducing investments and,

defining I * (aˆ S , I (i), ρˆ j ) ≡ I (i, j ) , the following regularities hold: G 1 11 G 1 1 2 ≥ G 1 1 G 1 2

and  G 11 ( I ( i , R ), ρˆ j ) ∂ I ( i , R ) ∂ a

S ,I

  G 1 1 ( I ( i , D ), ρˆ j ) ∂ I ( i , D ) ∂ a

S ,I

 ≥ 1

(6)

Before stage 3., the firm chooses the non-observable and non-contractible I as to
maximize her expected ex post utility subject to the budget constraint:
I * arg max I ≥0 {G( I , ρˆ j ) + tˆ −ψ (aˆ S , I )} s.t.: A + ( p − c)q ≥ t + I .

(7)

I* depends from both the power of the incentive scheme and the level of ρj and the
inter-party distance d and the optimal ρ are such that: ρˆ R > ρˆ D and d > λ . So I
have that: I1 (aˆ S , I , ρˆ R ) ≥ I1 (aˆ S , I , ρˆ D ) ≥ 0 . Clearly, a partisan planner takes into

account the political uncertainty and increases the power of the scheme the deeper
the fear of expropriation is. Defining G ( I (i, j ), ρˆ j ) ≡ G (i, j ) , the ex post expected
welfare function for a type j planner is:

16
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(

)

W jAI ,S , I (i, j ) = WPAI , S (i) + vγ (i) (1 + λ + χ j )G (i, j ) + ( χ j − 1 − λ ) I (i, j )  − ο 1 − ∂G (i, j ) ∂I .

with I (i, j ) ≡ I (i, − j ) + x j ( I (i, j ) − I (i, − j )) and G (i, j ) ≡ G (i, − j ) + x j (G (i , j ) − G (i, − j )) .
The equilibrium effort for the low type firm is defined as: ψ ′ ( aˆ
= qˆ S , I −

{

1
1
v γ ( i )  λ Φ ′ ( aˆ
1+ λ 1− v

− ( χ j − 1 − λ ) ∂ I ( i , j ) ∂ a

S ,I

S ,I

S ,I

)=

) − (1 + λ + χ j ) ∂ G ( i , j ) ∂ a

 + ο  ∂ 2 G ( i , j ) ∂ I ∂ a

S ,I

S ,I

}

 .


+

(8)

Non contractibility of investment along with sharp conflicts over the size of
investments’ aids among different consumer groups generate the last three new
and positive terms in the cost-reimbursement rule. These terms are affected by
both the inter-party distance d and the holding on power xj. The latter effect is
diametrically different among contrasting partisan planners when the role of
public incentives is greater (condition (6)). Such a strategic institutional design15
extends to the incentive schemes’ reform the foundations suggested by Guerriero
[2006 a] to the supervisors’ selection rules. Proposition 2 summarizes as follows:

Proposition 2: A. Higher powered incentive schemes will be linked to high cost
industries. B. The likelihood of a reform toward more powerful incentive schemes
is higher the higher is the inter-party distance and the higher (lower) is the
holding on power if the reformer is Republican (Democratic). The presence of a
Republican incumbent reformer increases the likelihood of these reforms.
These results are strongly at odd with the seminal analysis in Laffont [1996].
There the relation with an incumbent Republican has opposite signs and the

15

Several studies demonstrate that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to

employ institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to impose constraints on
future incumbents (see Persson and Svensson [1988] and Tabellini and Alesina [1990]).
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incentive rule was insensitive to the holding on power with a Democratic planner.
The deep reason is that when loosing the chance of fixing the preferred level of ρj
becomes more costly (high inter-party distance) an incumbent planner is willing
to distort the incentive scheme even more toward less rent extraction.

3.2 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribing
When positive rents remain in equilibrium, they can be employed to capture either
partisan parties or directly supervisors. Indeed, Proposition 1 results somewhat
weakened when an organized group interested in maximizing the regulated firm’s
rent is considered. Both ALJs and PUCs’ commissioners exert effort in other
tasks. As seen above, examples are the control of bypassing by non-regulated
utilities and the analysis of environmental regulation. Well, it turns out that the
organized group can relax the supervision constraint offering side-contracts
conditional on this second effort level supposed observable and contractible;16 As
in Alesina and Tabellini [2005 a], the interest group has all the bargaining power
and influences supervisors either directly (bribes) or indirectly (campaign
contributions) before the effort is decided in stages 3. or in 4.. The level of
performance from the extra task h brings a small positive extra-utility to the firm
but implies a relevant cost of effort to the supervisor as captured by a nondivisible effort cost function C ( eiS,l + eih,l, S ) . In a jointly optimal equilibrium eˆiS,l = 0
so that the high type’s firm enjoys a higher informational rent (proofs are
available upon request). Even if discouraging, these equilibria are fragile and the

16

Here I take aside the eventual multiple principal-multiple agents’ strategic interaction, i.e. cost

minimization across supervisors’ side payments. This remains as open agenda for future research.
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following remarks apply: 1 Bribes do not arise if the punishment that a supervisor
receives if caught is high enough; 2 Campaign contributions, although legal,
would be not even affordable for the interest group, which has to reimburse
supervisors for the entire amount of implicit incentives (multiplicative precision
technology); 3. Judges are less corruptible even if the return to bribe them is
higher (they exert a higher level of effort). Thus, provided that implicit incentives
are high enough - high values of τ, R and J in (1) - the model remains robust to
possible lobbying and bribing. The next section will face this complex theory,
except the firm’s lobby part, to the data. The next section will subject this
complex theory, except the interest group part, to the U.S. electric market’s data.

4. Evidence
The main contribution of the empirical part of the paper is to address finally the
constitutional determinants of the reform of cost-reimbursement rules in regulated
market, giving, besides, evidence on the effect of the reforms toward performance
based regulations on the US Electric power market prices. As Table 2.A and 2.B
report, between 1982 and 2002, 41 of the 144 major IOUs operating in the US
electric power market switched to some kind of performance based regulations.
This enormous wave of change has been interesting 25 of the 49 continental US
states and constitutes a perfect source of variation able to test the above model.
The empirical questions are: what forces have shaped the reforming planners’
incentives at the constitutional tables? How strong were the political positions and
how much did the reformer take into consideration efficiency reasons? Can the
data reveal the extent of substitutability between market and political institutions?

19
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Such a wide variation over cross sections (i.e. states and firms within states) and
time nicely lends itself to a panel approach; moreover, as underlined in Persson
and Tabellini [2003], a cross sectional analysis will deliver here fragile inference
given the “non-random pattern of constitutional reforms and the extensive
differences among [individuals] belonging to different constitutional groups.”
Thus, I will make use of two main models for evaluating respectively the
determinants of the constitutional reforms and the effects of PBRs on prices: 1. a
random effects panel with dependent variable a binary for the presence of
performance-based regulations; 2. a panel pass-trough pricing equation.

Proposition 1 and 2 arise a set of empirical predictions summarized as follows:
Empirical Prediction: 1. A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to more
efficient supervision technologies, high cost industries and elected supervisors. B.
High powered incentive schemes are more likely with Republican reformers, the
higher is the inter-party distance and the higher (lower) is the holding on power if
the incumbent reforming party was Republican (Democratic). 2. High powered
incentive schemes lower the level of equilibrium prices.

4.1 Non Random Constitution Selection
First of all, let define institutions. The high powered incentive schemes’ dummy
(PBR_F and PBR) takes value 1 if the firm (or the state) adopts a broadly defined
(rate freeze, price or revenue cap with possible earnings sharing)17 performance
based regulation and 0 otherwise (i.e., cost of service regulation). In order to
evaluate the Empirical Prediction, I make use of several proxies for the efficiency

17

See EEI, [2000] and Sappington et al. [2001] for a precise definition of each scheme.
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of the production and signal extraction technologies and the inter-party
competition. The latter is captured by the absolute distance between Democrats
and Republicans (Av_Dist) while the incumbent’s holding on power is measured
by the average percentage of seats held by the majority party (Av_Maj).18 Let me
define selection rules as: Jud_Elec, an elected judges’ dummy, and Reg_Elec, an
elected regulators’ dummy. More complex it is to find proxies able to directly
quantify the efficiency of the supervision technology; my strategy is to use the
two sets of observables that most likely enhance the likelihood of information
extraction: proxies for the presence of powerful watchdog groups and proxies for
the amount of staff’s resources. The first set includes: Young (proportion aged 517), Ind and Res (proportion of revenues form sales to industrial and residential
users respectively). Staff’s resources are measured by the PUC’s staff budget
(Budget) and the number of permanent staff’s members (Employ). The latter,
unfortunately, is a very crude proxy for efficiency; different and unobservable (in
my data) skills are required to the PUC’s members so it is not clear in what
measure higher values of Employ provide the planner with a more precise signal
or instead relax the assumed benevolence. Finally, investments’ concerns are
captured by proxies for costly generation (cst) and more crudely by residential
prices (Rkhr). Generations by nuclear and fuel sources (Gen_Fuel, Gen_Nucl) are
introduced (one at the time to avoid multicollinearity) to control for difference in
generation sources across states. Finally, other controls are state population (Pop),
income (Income) and electricity sales (Sales). A full account of the variables’
source and construction is given in the Appendix 6.2 and Table 1. Table 3 presents
the results of the random effects Logit model. While columns (1) and (2) report,
18

See Hanssen [2004] for a detailed explanation of the proxies’ choice.
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respectively, the estimates for a panel of 49 states for the samples 1970-1997 and
1980-1997; column (3) shows the evidence when the same model is estimated for
a panel of 143 firms over the same 49 states over the period 1980-1997 (the
Potomac Electric Power Company is excluded given the non-availability of data
points for the District of Columbia). Note that in column (3), the right hand side
variables vary only across states and time and identification is obtained through
the firms specific random effects. The evidence strongly supports the model
predictions. For what concern the proxies for the holding on power, the results
arbitrate clearly in favor of the strategic use explanation. The holding on power
increases the probability of a reform toward higher powered incentive schemes if
interacted with a Republican incumbent while the sign of Av_Maj is negative
within the Democratic incumbents’ group. Republican incumbent are more likely
to reform toward PBR.19 All the proxies are highly significant (almost all at 1%5%) except Av_Maj in column (1) and Av_Dist in columns (1) and (3). Looking to
selection rules, it is clear (even if Jud_Elec is significant at 20% in column (3)
and negative in column (2)) that the planner substitutes out costly rent-extraction
incentives (COS) with accountability-driving institutions. A bit more mixed is the
evidence on the efficiency of the signal extraction technology. The relevant
proxies show the correct sign except Employ always negative and Res and Ind
negative in columns (2) and (3). While the first sign comes at no surprise given
the above remark, an appealing explanation for the last two is that, in a dynamic
set up, the friction between supervisors and interested parties would become so
19

The impact of an incumbent Republican reformer is given by the sum of the coefficient on Rep

plus the coefficient on PBR*Rep multiplied for the mean of Av_Maj. In columns (1) and (3) these
figures are respectively: 4.26 = – 25.54 + 44.48*0.67 and 5.43 = – 15.00 + 31.92*0.64.
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sour to deteriorate the quality of the signal. Finally investment concerns (high cost
industries) increase the attractiveness of high powered cost-reimbursement rules.

Section 4.2 closes the empirical evidence looking to the relation between price
and high powered incentive schemes. To this extent, a wide literature, mainly
based on telecommunications’ market data, has delivered the following stylized
facts: PBRs delivers lower prices and higher earnings with no relevant reduction
in overall service quality.20 What these studies lack is an endogenous treatment of
the regulatory institutions: the next section will fill this hole.

4.2 Pricing Models
The model considered relates electricity prices charged at state level to various
cost items plus fixed effect terms for regulation regimes. Utilities set prices at
system wide average costs. The only rough and available measure is the fossil
fuels’ component (see Besley and Coate [2003]). This item is useful in assessing
the pass through of cost shocks into prices and helps in controlling the differences
in the production structures. Thus, I test point 2. of the Empirical Prediction
running, for each customer class, a panel regression of the form:

ps ,t = η s + ϑt + φ1 Reg _ Elecs ,t + φ2 Jud _ Elecs ,t + φ3 Jud _ Elecs ,t +
+υ1 PBRs ,t cs ,t + υ 2 Jud _ Elecs ,t cs ,t + υ3cs ,t + ϕ Cons ,t + ε s ,t .

(9)

In (9) ps ,t is a price for state s in year t; η s are state fixed effects controlling for
long-run differences in production and distribution systems; ϑt are year dummies
20

Sappington et al. [2001] offer a complete and clear cut summary of the literature. Kridel,

Sappington and Weisman [1996] is a review of the first pieces of evidence on PBRs. The same
scope has Hill [1995] for studies focusing on the electric power market.
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picking up macro-shocks and common changes in federal policy; Cons ,t includes
state specific time varying controls (Gen_Fuel, Gen_Nucl, Income, Income2, Pop,
Pop2, Sales) and proxies for the efficiency of the supervision technology: Res,
Ind, Young, Budget, Employ. PBRs ,t , Jud _ Elecs ,t and Reg _ Elecs ,t represent the

time varying dummies for PBRs and election rules respectively. Table 10 reports
the main figures. The model has always an explanatory power higher than 85%
and all the proxies for the efficiency of the supervision technology (not shown)
are highly significant and have an attached coefficient with the correct sign. The
coefficient on costs interacted with whether a state has switched incentive
schemes is always negative but never significant when Jud _ Elecs ,t is included.
The high significance of the latter suggests that implicit political incentives are
more effective. This would also explain in an appealing way the lags in the
introduction of PBRs in the US. The direct effect of PBRs ,t is both significant and
positive on residential and commercial rates. Can these results be driven by a
failure in conditional independence? Table 5 addresses such a question. Here, (9)
is estimated with the Arellano-Bond procedure without fixed effects but with one
lag of the dependent variable; Av_Maj, Rep, Av_Maj*Rep only are employed as
extra instruments to avoid weak instrumentation (the over-identifying restrictions
are never rejected). As column (1) through (3) show the indirect effect of PBRs ,t
is not significant but now null; the direct effect becomes negative: OLS seems to
overestimate the overall effect of the reform toward more powerful schemes. This
has a significant (at 10%) marginal negative effect on residential prices implying
a 2.5% reduction on the residential bills over the 1970-1997 sample. The weak
significance is mainly due to the variation captured by the first lag of prices.
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5. Concluding Remarks
As the theoretical section broadly explains price-cap and cost-plus regulation do
arbitrate the rent-efficiency trade-off in quite different ways: an eventually
partisan planner would take into account not only the different comparative
advantages of different rules but would also use strategically more powered
schemes to tie the hands of new incumbents’ parties. I test these propositions on a
panel of U.S. states. The results show how the probability of a reform from a low
powered incentive scheme to a higher powered one has been linked to Republican
incumbents, a higher interparty distance, high cost structures and the presence of
more efficient supervision technology and elected supervisors. Less clear remains
the effect of PBRs on regulated prices; OLS tend to overestimate the overall
effect of the reform on electricity rates and such an effect seems to be negative
even if significant only for residential rates. However the point remains as open
agenda for further research along with a multidimensional analysis of differently
powered incentive rules.21 All in all, the evidence on the constitutional reforms’
likelihood is robust to different estimation procedures and disturbance hypotheses
and rationalizes the great wave of change that has interested the market during the
last decades. Indeed, at the constitutional table, planners have solved the rent
extraction vs. efficiency trade off substituting out, according to their own partisan
interests, costly - in terms of efficiency - explicit market’s incentives (i.e., cost of
service) with implicit institutional accountability designs (i.e., election).

21

When I employ a multinomial Logit and an ordered Logit estimator, the main results remain

unchanged (not shown). In the latter model PBR is set equal to 1 if a COS regulation is employed,
3 if a pure price cap is in use and 2 if any other PBR scheme is the incentive scheme adopted.
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Tables Legend
Preliminary Analysis
Table 1: Variables Names and Descriptions.
Table 2.A: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).
Table 2.B: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).

Non Random Constitution Selection
Table 3: Determinants of Incentive Schemes - RE Logit Panel Estimates.

Pricing Equations
Table 4: Results on Pass-Through - Fixed Time/State Effects Estimates.
Table 5: Results on Pass-Through - Arellano-Bond Estimates.

6. Appendix
6.1 Solution without Supervision and Investment Concerns
Maximizing (1) with respect of U, e and q yields the following:
1. The existence of the shadow cost of rewards implies no rent for the firm:
U=0

or

t ≡ ψ(a*);

2. The disutility of effort is equalized to the saving in average cost at the margin:

ψ′ (a*) = q*

or

a ≡ a*;

3. The social marginal value and cost of output are equalized:
V′ (q) = (1+λ) (β – a)

or

S′ (q) = p = c.
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The regulated firm receives a price p implicitly defined by the following contract:
A + pPCq(pPC) = S′ (q) = d – (C – C*).
Here d = ψ(a*) and PC stands for price cap. The firm chooses a in order to maximize a –
((β – a)q – C*) – ψ(a).22 A price–cap gives the right incentives for cost reduction and the
fixed charge C* can be tailored to fully extract the firm’s rent.

■

The socially optimal Iˆ minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs:

Iˆ ∈ arg min I I + v(1 + ζ ( I )) β + [1 − v(1 + ζ ( I ))] β = I + β − v(1 + ζ ( I ))∆β

(A.1)

This amounts to say that the objective in (A.1) assumes a value greater at I* than at Iˆ .
Evidently, the same can be said for the objective function in (5). Once I sum these two
inequalities, the following expression holds in equilibrium:

I * + β − v(1 + ζ ( I * )) ∆β + v(1 + ζ ( I * ))[1 − γ (eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J )]Φ(a ( I * )) − I * ≥
Iˆ + β − v(1 + ζ ( Iˆ))∆β + v(1 + ζ ( Iˆ))[1 − γ (eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J )]Φ(a ( I * )) − Iˆ
or v (ζ ( Iˆ) − ζ ( I * )) {∆β − [1 − γ (eˆiS, R , eˆiS, J )]Φ (a ( I * ))} ≥ 0 . Given the properties of ζ ′(i) and

the first order conditions of (5), this inequality is met for ζ ( Iˆ) ≥ ζ ( I * ) or I * ≤ Iˆ . Noting
how, if it is likely, the cost of investment is lower in low cost market and taking the
comparative statics with respect to K, Proposition 2.B follows.

■

6.2 Data
This analysis exploits both cross sectional and time variation in the data. Three are the
main data sets: a panel of 49 states for the samples 1970-1997 (1372 observations) and
1980-1997 (888 observations) and a panel of 143 firms over the same 49 states over the
period 1980-1997 (2574 observations). Nebraska has been excluded because it has no
investor–owned utilities while the District of Columbia is not considered because no data
points are available before 1987. Unbalanced panels deliver the same results.
22

Note that, as long as the planner knowsβ, she can infer effort from the observation of cost.

30
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

31

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 3 [2006]

B.1 Data on incentive schemes are directly collected from:

B.1.1 EEI, [2000], PBR Survey (Member Survey), EEI, Washington D.C.
B.1.2 Sappington, D. E.M., J. P. Pfeifenberger, P. H. and G. N. Basheda, [2001].
B.2 Data on electric prices, generation and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net

Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook:
EEI, [1995], 1960-1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry;
EEI, [1993-1997], Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry, Washington DC.
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA,
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Prices are calculated from the revenues and
sales in terms of cents per Kwh. Residential, commercial and industrial users account for
the 95% of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy for generation
in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the generator and by
energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the second one.
B.3 To construct the fossil fuel cost index for state i in year t, let sjit be the share of

energy source j in state i in year t and let pit be the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net
Kwh (in cents per Kwh) for state i in year t, calculated as: pit = Σj (qjit/qit) pijt. Then the
fossil fuel cost series will be given by cit = Σj sjit pit where sit is the share of electricity
produced in state i in year t by the fossil fuel energy sources j (i.e.: coal, gas and oil).
B.4 Data on regulatory selection rules, PUCs’ budgets and number of PUCs’ full time

employees are collected directly from:
NARUC, [1970-1997], Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies, NARUC, Washington DC.
B.5 Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks:

CSG, [1970-1997], The Book of the States, CSG, Lexington, KY.
B.6 Data on judges’ selection rule and length terms are collected from Hanssen, F.

Andrew [2004, Table 1] and Besley, Timothy and A. Abigail Payne, [2003, Table 1].
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B.7 State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5-

17 are calculated from a U.S. Census Bureau (UCB) publication:

UCB, [1970-1997], Population Estimates Program, UCB, Washington DC.

7.2 Tables

Preliminary Analysis

Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions.
Variables

Pricing Rules

PBR

Prices

Rkhr/c/i
Av_Maj:

Political
Variables

Description
Dummy taking value 1 if the rule is in use in the state, 0 otherwise.
(PBR_F = Dummy taking value 1 if the firm uses the rule, 0
otherwise).
Revenue per Kwh sales (residential, commercial, industrial).
Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by
majority party.

Av_Dist:

Absolute difference between percentage of seats held by Democrats
and Republicans.

Rep:
Reg_Elec:

Dummy taking value 1 if the government is Republican, 0 otherwise.
Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected, 0 otherwise.

Jud_Elec:
Budget:

Dummy taking value 1 if judges are elected, 0 otherwise.
PUC’s total receipts in thousands dollars.

Employ:
Over_65:

PUC’s full time employees.
Percentage of population aged 65 and over.

Young:

Percentage of population aged 5-17.

Res:

Percentage of Sales from customers who are residential.

Ind:
cst:
Gen_Fuel:

Percentage of Sales from customers, which are industrial.
Cost of fossil fuels (in cents per Kwh sales) – see Appendix 6.2.
Percentage of total generation from fossil fuels sources.

Gen_Nucl:

Percentage of total generation from nuclear source.

Sales:

Sales in thousands Mwh.

Pop:

State population in thousands people.

Income:

State income in thousands dollars.

Selection Rules

Supervision
Technology

Watchdog
Groups

Average Cost

Other Controls
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Table 2.A: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).
States
AL

AZ

AR

CA

CO#

CT

DE
DC

FL

GA

HI

ID

IL

IN

IA

KS

KY

LA

ME

MD

MA

MI

MN

MS

MO

MT
NV

IOUs
AL Po. Co. ;
AZ Pu. Se. Co. ,
Tucson El. Po. Co.;
Entergy AR Inc. ;
Pacific Gas & El. Co. ,
San Diego Gas & El. Co. , *
Southern CA Edison;*
Pu. Se. Co. of CO;*
Citizen Utilities Co. ,
CT Light & Po. Co. ,*
United Illuminating Co. ;
Delmarva Po. & Light Co.;
Potomac El. Po. Co.;
FL Po. & Light Co. ,
FL Po. Co. ,
Gulf Po. Co. ,
Tampa El. Co. ;*
GA Po. Co. ,
Savannah El. & Po. Co. ;
HI El. ,*
Maui El. Co. Ltd. ;
ID Po. Co. ;
Central IL Light Co. ,
Central IL Pu. Se. Co. ,*
Commonwealth Edison Co. ,
IL Po. Co. ,
Mt. Carmel Pu. Se. Co. ;
IN Michigan Po. Co. ,
Indianapolis Po. & Light Co. ,
Northern In. Pu.Se.Co. ,
PSI Energy Inc. ,
Southern IN Gas & El. Co. ;
Interstate Po. Co. ,
IES Ut. Inc. ,
MidAmerican Energy Co.;*
KS Gas & El.Co.,
Western Resources Inc.;
KY.Po. Co. ,
KY Ut. Co. ,
Louisville Gas & El. Co. ,*
Union Light Heat & Po. Co.;
Central LA Inc. ,
Entergy LA Inc. ,*
Entergy New Orleans Inc. ,
Southwestern El. Po. Co. ;
Bangor Hydro-El. Co. ,
Central ME Po. Co. ,
ME Pu. Se. Co. ;*
Baltimore Gas & El. Co. ,*
Potomac El. Co.;*
Boston Edison Co. ,
Cambridge El. Light Co. ,
Commonwealth El. Co. ,
Eastern Edison Co. ,*
Fitchburg Gas & El. Light Co. ,
MA El. Co. ,
Western MA. El. Co. ;*
Consumers Energy Co. ,
Detroit Edison Co. ,
Edison Sault El. Co. ,
Upper Peninsula Po.Co. ;
MN Po. & Light Co.,
Northern State Po. Co. ,
Otter Tail Po. Co.;*
Entergy MS Po. Co. ,*
MS Po. Co.;*
Empire District El. Co. ,
Kansas City Po. & Light Co. ,
St Joseph Light & Po. Co. ,
Union El. Co. ,*
UtilCorp United Co.;
MT Po. Co. ;*
NV Po. Co. ,

PBR
Rate case moratorium;
None,
None;
None;
None,
Revenue and price cap with earnings sharing (see also case A.98-01-014),
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case A.93-12-029);
Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing (see also case 95A and 99A-531EG);
None,
Price cap (see also case 99-06-21 filed in 2000),
None;
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
Rate freeze with earnings sharing;
None,
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 96-0493 filed 1996),
None;
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None;
None,
None,
Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing (see also APP-96-1, RPU-96-8);
None,
None;
None,
None,
Revenue sharing (see also case 98-426/7 filed in 1998),
None;
None,
Rate case moratorium with earning sharing (see also case U-20925 filed in 1996),
None,
None;
Rate freeze for distribution services,
Revenue-per-customer cap and price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing;
Price cap (see also case 8794/8804 filed in 1998),
Price cap and rate freeze (see also case 8796 filed in 1999);
None,
None,
None,
Revenues sharing (see also case 96/94 filed in 1998),
None,
Rate freeze with earning sharing,
Revenue sharing (see also case 97-120 filed in 1998);
None,
None,
None,
None;
None,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing;
Benchmarks (see also case 93-UA-301 filed in 1994),
Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing;
None,
None,
None,
Rate freeze with earnings sharing (see also case EM-96-149 filed in 1997),
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also D95.9.128 filed 1996);
None;

Period
1982-2002

1994-2002
1997-2001
1996-2006

2000-2001

1995-1999

1997-1999

1998-2002
1998-2002
1998-2002
1998-2002
1998-2002

1998-2000

1999-2000

1996-2002

1995-2000
1991-2007
1996-2000
1998-2002
2000-2002

1998-2000
1998-2009
1998-2000

2001-2005
2001-2005
1994-1998
1995-2001

1995-2001

1997-1998
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Table 2.B: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).
States
IOUs
NV Sierra Pacific Po. Co.;
NH Pu. Se. Co. of NH;
Atlantic City El. Co. ,
Jersey Central Po. & Light Co. ,
NJ Pu. Se. El. & Gas Co. ,
Rockland El. Co.;
NM Pu. Se. Co. of NM;
Central Hudson Gas & El. Co. ,
Consolidated Edison Co.– NY Inc. ,
Long Island Lighting Co. ,
NY NY State El. & Gas Co. ,*
Niagara Mohawk Po. Co. ,*
Orange & Rockland Utils Inc.,
Rochester Gas and El. Co.;*
Carolina Po. & Light Co. ,
NC Duke Po. Co. ,
Nanthala o. & Light Co.;
ND MDU Resources Group Inc.;
Cincinnati Gas & El. Co. ,
Cleveland El. Illumination Co. ,
Columbus Southern Po. Co. ,
OH Dayton Po. & Light Co. ,
OH Edison Co. ,
OH Po. Co. ,
Toledo Edison Co. ;
OK Gas & El. Co. ,
OK
Pu. Se. Co. of OK ;
PacifiCorp ,*
OR
Portland General El. Co. ;
Duquesne Light Co. ,
Metropolitan Edison Co. ,
PA El. Co. ,
PA PA Po. & Light Co. ,
PA Po. Co. ,
PECO Energy Co. ,
West Penn Power Co. ;
Blackstone Valley Electric Co. ,*
RI Narragansett Electric Co. ,*
Newport Electric Co. ;*
Lockhart Power Co. ,
SC
SC El. & Gas Co. ;
Black Hills Co. ;
SD
Northwestern Pu. Se. Co. ;
TN Kingsport Po. Co. ;
Central Po. & Light Co. ,
El Paso El. Co. ,
Entergy Gulf States Inc. ,
Houston Lighting & Po. Co. ,
TX Southwestern El. Se. Co. ,
Southwestern Pu. Se. Co. ,
TX Utilities Electric Co. ,*
TX-New Mexico Power Co. ,*
West TX Ut. Co. ;
Central VT Pu. Se. Co. ,
VT
Green Mountain Po. Co. ;
Appalachian Po. Co. ,
VA
VA Electric & Po. Co. ;
Puget Sound Energy
WA
Washington Water Po. Co. ;
Monongahela Po. Co. ,
WV
Wheeling Po. Co. ;
Consolidated Water Po. Co. ,
Madison Gas & El. Co. ,
Northern States Po. Co. ,
Northwestern WI El. Co. ,
Pioneer Po. & Light Co. ,
WI
South Beloit Water Gas & El. Co. ,
Superior Water Light & Po. Co. ,
WI El. Po. Co. ,
WI Po. & Light Co. ,
WI Pu. Se. Co. .

PBR
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
None;
None;
None,
Revenue-per-customer cap with earnings sharing,
None,
Price-cap (for base rates) with earnings sharing (see also case 96-E-0891),
Revenue cap and rate freeze- price cap,
None,
Revenue capand rate case moratorium with earnings sharing;
None,
None,
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None;
None,
None;
Price and revenue cap with earnings sharing,
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 2498/2514 filed in 1996),
Price cap and rate freeze with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 2498/2514 filed in 1996);
None,
None;
Rate freeze (see also case EL95-003 filed in 1995),
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
Benchmarks (see also case 21112),
Benchmarks,
None;
None,
None;
None,
None;
Price cap,
None;
None,
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None.

Period

1995-2005
1993-2002
1991-2002
1993-2002

1994-2001

1997-1998
1997-1998
1997-2004

1995-2005

2000-2002
2000-2002

1997-2001

Notes: 1. El., Inc., Po., Pu., Se. are for respectively Company, Electric, Incorporation, Power, Public, Service;
2. IOUs included in the EEI report show the * index;
3. Relevant PUC’s docket in parentheses.
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Non Random Constitution Selection

Table 3: Determinants of Incentive Schemes - RE Logit Estimates.
Dependent Var.:
Av_Maj

Av_Maj*Rep

Rep

Av_Dist

Reg_Elec

Jud_Elec

Budget

Employ

Res

Ind

Young

cst

(1)
PBR

(2)
PBR

(3)
PBR_F

- 4.164
(17.767)
44.479
(16.949)***
- 25.536
(10.777)**
5.781
(8.578)
18.322
(5.364)***
3.566
(1.963)*
0.0001
(0.00004)***
-0.022
(0.0083)***
229.258
(66.781)***
16.025
(12.291)
1.537
(0.465)***

- 80.175
(38.534)**
207.118
(75.047)***
- 92.575
(34.317)***
34.969
(13.700)***
73.655
(27.132)***
-19.962
(7.492)***
0.0004
(0.00015)***
-0.041
(0.016)**
-130.166
(57.182)**
-69.580
(43.204)
4.860
(1.775)***

- 27.383
(14.761)*
31.915
(11.048)***
- 14.995
(6.840)**
2.455
(5.604)
20.202
(4.518)***
2.499
(1.742)
0.00008
(0.00002)***
-0.026
(0.0075)***
-63.238
(16.823)***
-36.977
(12.051)***
0.415
(0.172)**

4.203
(1.400)***

6.906
(3.844)*

2.702
(0.627)***

Rkhr

Gen_Nucl

-14.211
(6.277)**

Gen_Fuel

Sales

Income

Pop

Constant

0.0002
(0.00007)***
0.0020
(0.0006)***
- 2.47 e-08
(1.38e-07)
-206.191
(58.931)***
Random Effects Logit
1372
- 58.469

-122.461
(44.931)***
0.0003
(0.0001)***
0.005
(0.002)***
- 7.57 e-07
(3.35e-07)**
-94.809
(46.043)**
Random Effects Logit
882
- 45.212

-0.00005
(0.00003)**
0.001
(0.0003)***
7.92 e-07
(1.99e-07)***
-27.835
(13.194)**
Random Effects Logit
2574
- 109.498

Estimation
N. of Obs.
Log Likelihood
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Pricing Equations

Table 4: Results on Pass-Through - Fixed Time/State Effects Estimates.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Rkhr
Rkhc
Rkhi
0.457
0.540
0.203
(0.182)**
(0.181)***
(0.149)
-0.092
0.186
0.043
Reg_Elecst
(0.203)
(0.201)
(0.165)
-0.091
-0.214
0.171
Jud_Elecst
(0.158)
(0.156)
(0.129)
PBRst .cst
-0.001
-0.159
-0.068
(0.125)
(0.124)
(0.102)
-0.394
-0.366
-0.302
Jud_Elecst .cst
(0.082)***
(0.082)***
(0.067)***
0.542
0.498
0.470
cst
(0.054)***
(0.053)***
(0.044)***
Budgetst , Employst , Resst , Indst , Youngst , Gen_Fuelst ,
Other Controls
Gen_Nuclst , Popst , (Popst)2 , Incomest , (Incomest)2 , Salesst .
Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator.
Estimation
1372
1372
1372
N. of Obs.
2
0.89
0.87
0.85
R
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Dependent Var.:
PBRst

Table 5: Results on Pass-Through - Arellano-Bond Estimates.
Dependent Var.:
PBRst

PBRst .cst

Other Controls

(1)
(2)
(3)
Rkhr
Rkhc
Rkhi
-0.189
0.069
- 0.023
(0.106)*
(0.137)
(0.123)
0.082
0.025
0.034
(0.066)
(0.076)
(0.067)
Constantst ,Dependent Var.(-1)st , Reg_Elecst , Jud_Elecst ,
Jud_Elecst .cst , cst , Budgetst , Employst , Resst , Indst , Youngst ,
Gen_Fuelst , Gen_Nuclst , Popst , (Popst)2 , Incomest , (Incomest)2 ,
Salesst .

Additional
Av_Majst ,Av_Majst*Repst , Repst .
Instruments
Arellano-Bond estimator for dynamic panel.
Estimation
0.98
0.99
0.99
Ov-Id Test (P-Value)
1274
1274
1274
N. of Obs.
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;
3. One-step results employed for inference on coefficients.
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A Francesco e Pierluigi con Amore e Profondo Rispetto.

1. Introduction
A major task of economics is to explain the pattern of government intervention in
industries that is to say industrial policy. An idealized, but illuminating, view of
regulatory institutions is that they result from a broadly defined constitution
drafted by some benevolent “founders” behind a veil of ignorance. This “public
interest” research program derives policies able to correct market failures such as
monopoly pricing. In the last twenty years this paradigm has been substantially
improved by explicitly considering informational asymmetries. Indeed, industrial
policy can be thought as resulting from the optimal trade-off between efficiency
enhancement and rent extraction and, in regulating a natural monopoly, the
planner would select optimal cost-reimbursement rules, which arbitrate differently
between cost reducement effort (moral hazard) and informational rents (adverse
selection). Price-cap favours efficiency, while cost of service regulation (COS)
favours rent extraction. However, the public interest approach completely fails in
taking into account both the watchdog role of consumers’ interest groups and the
delicate set of checks on bureaucrats and politicians. Judges have discretionary
power and they can compete with executive branches and regulators in filling in
unforeseen contingencies (see Shapiro [1986], Spiller and Tiller [1999] and
Guerriero [2006 a]). Politicians may favour interest groups leaving substantial
rents to the officials involved in regulation (see Becker [1985] and Wilson
[1980]). Recently, the New Theory of Regulation program has tried to overcome
such an inconsistency, employing both principal-agent and political economy
models. The main merits of this literature are two: 1. the explicit design of the
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political system details and of the positive forces driving public intervention; 2.
the crucial role entrusted to private information in giving rent seeking incentives
to regulated firms’ interest groups and a signal extraction role to the hierarchical
structure of real world regulatory institutions. When explicit contracts on
observable performances or efforts are available for supervisors, the low type
quantity-effort allocation is distorted even more to take into account the eventual
capture, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchy (Laffont and Tirole
[1993] and Laffont and Martimort [1999]), and the planner’s partisan interests
(Laffont [1996, 2000]). In collusion-proof equilibria (i.e. in which capture does
not prevail), costly incentive payments are given to non-benevolent regulators for
a value equal to the maximum expected collusion offer, which is the firm’s
expected stake (i.e. high type rent). Nevertheless, this set up basically fails in
capturing real world institutions. Regulators and judges are implicitly motivated
by simple election-appointment rules and the review processes’ structure makes
difficult to swallow the hypothesis that the effective role of these officials is one
of decision making (i.e.: to report the signal). Only recently, Guerriero [2006, a]
has given a first complete and realistic description of this complex agency
structure. A hierarchical rate review process emphasizes the judges’ generosity of
settlement, rendering the judicial role pivotal when judges want to leave a legacy
of correctness (“legacy effect”) and regulators are not willing to exert costly effort
because they are interested in obtaining job offers from the industry (“revolving
door effect”). Election strengthens the first effect and damps the second one.
Possibly partisan planners will take into consideration the efficiency of the signal
extraction technology and the accountability power of different selection rules in
designing the regulatory institutions. This paper brings two main contributions: 1.

3
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it broadens the scope of the Guerriero [2006 a]’s model to the optimal selection of
incentive schemes; 2. it empirically evaluates, for the first time in literature, the
merit of different cost-reimbursement selection theories, proving the explanatory
power of the model developed in Section 3 when faced with US electricity data.
Even if from 1997 a big wave of change is trying to enhance competition within
U.S. regulated markets, electricity firms along with all the other major utilities
(natural gas, trucking, telecommunications, water and wastewater, insurance,
railroad) are still regulated through the hierarchical structures analyzed below.
Moreover, the rising demand for technical specialization of judges involved in
regulation cases1 makes the U.S. lesson increasingly crucial in understanding how
to correctly design the regulatory institutions of many European markets. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details about
the US electricity market. Section 3 clarifies the efficiency-driven and strategic
determinants of incentive schemes; while section 4 tests the theory considering
the reform towards performance based regulations (PBR) in the US electric power
market. Section 5 discusses the evidence proposing an agenda for future research.
The Appendix contains tables, proofs and a detailed description of the data.

2. Institutions
Investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) account for over three-fourths of the
electricity sales and revenues of the U.S. electric power market. While jurisdiction

1

The Ahlstrom vs. European Commission [1993] and Enel vs. Wind-Infostrada [2002] cases have

stressed the need for a “gate-keeper” role of administrative judges as regards economics experts
witnesses within regulation-antitrust trials (see also Breyer [2003] and Motta [2004]).

4
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over both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies inside a federal
body (FERC), retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions
(PUCs), which deal with several markets and perform a broad range of tasks (e.g.
they suggest lines of conduct on services provision, they avoid by-passing by non
regulated utilities, they rule on environmental issues and so forth) among which
the most important is the regulation of prices.2 Regulated firms are not allowed to
receive governmental subsides and their revenue must cover their costs (including
managerial rewards). IOUs charge a two-part tariff, triggering rate reviews in
response to rising costs. Even if dockets can be directly entrusted to a
commissioner or to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), almost all the files
follow a precise hierarchical trial routine composed of two levels of formal
hearings open to all the interested parties (firms, ratepayers, lawyers of the
Attorney General’s Office). In the first instance, commissioners sit on the bench
and consumer advocates3 represent ratepayers. If the proposed filing is not
approved, a formal quasi-judicial hearing, presided by one or more ALJs, is
opened and the quasi-judicial tribunal takes a qualified majority enforceable
judgment. PUCs may review the case, provided that the onus of injustice and
illegality of the decision lies on the firm. Finally, utilities can also appeal to High
Courts on formal issues. These two last appeal levels are rarely granted. ALJs and
commissioners are either elected or appointed and, during the hearings, their role
is one of supervision: they examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence

2

Here I follow the descriptions contained in the 1992 and 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado

PUC and in the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) official website.
3

Consumer advocates are state-funded independent bodies established during the 70s and 80s in

the face of steeply rising rates in order to allow even residential users to proceed before PUCs.

5
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and interpret precedents and regulations. The final motion to be approved is
proposed by the PUC’s staff. This body is divided in a “trial” and in an “advisory”
team. While the latter reviews the case formulating a staff position in all equated
to the one of any other interested party; the former advices regulators and judges
on policy issues proposing de facto the motion. The complete record of the
hearings and the participation of all parties assure that the staff may consider only
the available “hard” evidence. This is a by-product of the “adversary” nature of
the hearings: no evidence can be denied once the precedent is individuated. Thus,
the design of incentive schemes can be modelled through the following version of
the Guerriero [2006, a]’s model.

3. Theory
The regulated firm produces a variable scale product q and it charges a two part
tariff A + pq for q > 0, where A and p are positive.4 Total cost is C = (β – a)q + υ
and a represents the manager’s effort, while β is an inefficiency parameter, which
turns out to be equal to β with probability v and to β with probability 1 – v, with

∆β ≡ β – β . Assuming that the fixed cost is known and normalizing it at zero (υ =

0), it is possible to denote marginal cost as c ≡ β – a. Regulation is subject to both
adverse selection (as captured by β) and moral hazard (as captured by a). Let me
assume that effort remains strictly positive over the relevant range of equilibrium
4

As Joskow and Schmalensee [1986] suggest the fixed premium paid by consumers turns out to

assume the some role of the governmental transfers typical of the regulation-procurement
literature. As a consequence, I will replace the economic shadow cost of public funds with the
marginal deadweight loss associated with an increase in the fixed premium.

6
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production. If the manager exerts effort level a, she lowers the marginal cost of
output by a, and incurs in a disutility (in monetary units) of ψ(a). This disutility is
increasing and convex in a (i.e.: ψ ′>0; ψ ′′>0); moreover the following holds:

ψ(0) = 0, lima →β ψ(a) = + ∞ and ψ ′′′>0.5 Consumers have the same preferences;
thus the demand is the one of a representative consumer with gross consumer
surplus given by S(⋅). The inverse and regular demand functions and the firm’s
revenue are given by p = P(q) = S ′(q), q = D(p), R(q) = P(q)q + A respectively.
Consumers choose q as to maximize net surplus S(⋅) – A – pq and A is optimally
fixed so as to make them indifferent between buying and not buying the good i.e.,
A ≡ S(q) – P(q)q. Firm’s revenues must cover average costs and managerial
compensation t (as underlined in section 2), i.e. A + (p – c)q(p) ≥ t. Both the firm
and the supervisors are risk neutral with respect to income. The firm’s utility is
given by U = t – ψ(a) and a reservation level of 0 is required. Let me denote the
social surplus obtained producing q as V(q) with V(0) = 0, V ′ > 0 and V ′′< 0.
V(q) is the sum of consumers’ net surplus plus the firm’s revenue evaluated at the
shadow price of managerial reward λ and it rewrites as:
V(q) = (S(q) – R(q)) + (1+λ)R(q) = S(q) +λR(q) = (1+λ)S(q).
The planner’s objective function, labelled with subscript P, is:
WP = S(q(p)) – A – pq(p) + (1+λ) [A + (p – c) q(p) – t] + U =

= V(q) – (1+λ)[(β – a)q+ψ(a)] – λU

(1)

Here, 1+λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the firm’s budget constraint.
Under complete information, the planner implements the first best allocation
5

This condition assures the concavity of the planner’s objective function and that the optimal

incentive scheme is deterministic.

7
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through a simple “fixed price” (or cost target) contract leaving no rent to the firm
(see Appendix 6.1 for details).6 Instead, under asymmetric information, the
planner observes only total cost and output7 and not a: as a result, β is now private
information of the firm. Label equilibrium rewards, outputs, total and marginal
costs, utilities and effort for the two types as:

{( t , q, C , c ,U , a ) , ( t , q , C , c ,U , a )}.

A contract based on the observables t and C specifies a reward-cost pair for each
type. As usual, the program envisions a solution with binding low (inefficient)
type’s individual rationality and high type’s incentive compatibility constraints:
U = t −ψ ( β − c ) = 0

(IR_L)

U = t −ψ ( β − c ) = U + ψ (β − c ) −ψ (β − c ) = Φ (a )

(IC_H)

where Φ(·) is an increasing function defined as Φ ( a ) ≡ ψ ( a ) − ψ ( a − ∆ β ) .8 Such
a solution entails an efficient level of effort and a positive informational rent U

for the high type and under-effort and no rent for the low type. Now suppose that
the planner can relax the informational asymmetry by employing a hierarchy of
two supervisors (i.e. a regulator and a judge) designed to match the institutions
described in section 2. The question is the following: is it possible to assess the ex
post efficiency of the incentive schemes selected by a possibly partisan planner?

6

Under this regime, realized costs, outputs and prices are verifiable. The planner knows β and acts

as a Stackelberg leader making take-or-live it offers on the observable a.
7

With a linear technology, the planner observes average costs, which are equal to marginal cost.

With know fixed cost υ, she observes (C – υ)/q = β – a and the analysis goes on unchanged.
8

Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for type β ( β ) is the one preferred

by type β ( β ) in the menu of managerial rewards-cost pairs. This amounts to say that:
t − ψ ( β − c ) ≥ t −ψ ( β − c )

(IC_H)

and

t −ψ (β − c ) ≥ t −ψ ( β − c )

(IC_L).

8
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As the following theory will make clear, the success of the regulatory regime
design is sensible to technological and political dimensions. As follows I will treat
the former underlining the main similarity with the Laffont and Tirole [1993]’s
model, leaving the positive side of the issue to the next subsection. There I will
compare the results with the seminal work of Laffont [1996].
The analysis tracks the approach of Guerriero [2006, a]. Supervisors can, exerting
costly effort, tailor the supervision activity to the specific docket (i.e., they choose
the number and quality of the experts, the firms’ official papers to be examined
and so forth). The equilibrium level of effort and the supervisors’ random ability
(e.g., ability to examine witnesses and to understand precedents and prevailing
regulations) determine the precision of the planner’s signal. As emphasized in
section 2, the report is effectively delivered by the PUC’s staff, so I simply
assume that the planner has directly at her disposal this benevolent information
tool.9 Besides, given that in the U.S. electricity market PUCs’ rules and conducts
prohibit communication between supervisors, no side contract is allowed between
these players. Once one of the two docket’s filing steps is set up, the planner
receives a signal σ = { β ; φ } about the cost structure with precision ξ, determined
by the supervisor’s activity. The information is hard, i.e. it is verifiable (in the
sense that every interested party can convince himself that the signal corresponds
to the true state of the world). If β = β with probability ξ the planner sees σ = β

and implements the complete information contract and with probability 1 – ξ she
observes σ = φ . If β = β , then σ = φ always. When σ = φ , the planner is

9

Besides the constraints imposed by the adversarial trial structure, explicit incentives can be

designed for staff’s members, who are not implicitly motivated by any appointment rule.

9
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uninformed, and she updates her beliefs applying Bayes rule.10 Supervisors are
evaluated according to the performance ξ ∈ [0, 1], which is described by the
docket’s records and is generated by a combination of effort e and random ability
α as ξ = αe + e; e takes value on (0, ξ u /2] with ξ u ∈ ( 0,1 ) and the effort’s cost
function writes as C (e) = C (e)(1 − K ) where K ∈ 0, K ) measures the effectiveness


of the signal extraction technology. K is increasing in the PUC’s resources and in
the watchdog groups’ ability to provide hard information. Suppose that: Ce > 0 ,

Cee > 0 , C (0) = 0 , limU C = ∞ . Thus, the full precision case is ruled out and it is
e →ξ 


not possible to obtain a precision of ξ u through effort only. The random ability α
has support (0, 1). Without loss of generality,11 suppose that α ~ Beta (g, b) with
1

density fy(y; g, b) = [yg–1(1 – y)b–1]/B(g, b) and B(g, b) = ∫ y g −1 (1 − y )b −1 dy (the
0

Beta function). The mean is α = g/(g + b). If g = b = 1, I obtain a uniform

distribution on (0, 1): from a Bayesian point of view, this is the case of
uninformative prior on the supervisors’ ability. The mild restrictions I impose on
g and b are such that the distribution of α is symmetric (g = b), which can be
relaxed and hump-shaped (informative), i.e. g > 1 and b > 1.12 If either e or ξ are
verifiable or contractible, “selling the store” contracts reach efficiency; but the
10

This technology simplifies the notation and has the appealing feature that the agent can provide

verifiable information only when the proof is possible: low cost case (see also Laffont [2000]).
11

Indeed, all the theoretical results continue to hold if one of the other continuous non degenerate

distributions supported on a bounded interval (i.e.: Triangular, Kumaraswamy, Logarithmic,
Uniform) is employed (see also footnote 13). Among these, the Beta function is the most versatile.
12

Here, α and e assume the meaning of overall measures: they take into account the different

judges’ and regulators’ abilities. For sake of comparison I will exhibit the case of equal draw of α.

10
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assumption that the planner can write unrestricted contingent contracts with the
supervisors does not fit in any way reality and so I assume that ξ is always
observable but not contractible. The timing of the game is given as follows:

1. Society (planner, firm, regulator and judge if addressed; see stage 3. and 4.
below) learns the nature of the regulatory environment: P(q) and that β ∈ {β , β } .
Next the firm discovers the only piece of private information: β.

2. The planner offers a menu of managerial reward-cost pairs to the firm
contingent to the realization of the eventual signals obtained through the hearing
process. An exogenously given wage s, set at the reservation level ŝ (assumed
equal for both judges and regulators), is given to the two supervisors.

3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; next she discovers her random ability
and, at last, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best
is implemented; otherwise a hearing is open and the judge is asked to rule it.

4. Step 3. is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the planner asks
to the firm to report its marginal cost (asymmetric information regime).

5. The firm exerts the chosen cost-reducing effort and a reward-quantity pair is
implemented. Finally, supervisors’ evaluators make their move. Note that for
elected supervisor the evaluator will be a rational electorate; while for appointed
ones she is a politician or a selection committee.
Supervisors face different incentives as a function of the nature of the task and of
the selection rule. The two dimensions of heterogeneity (regulators vs. judges and
appointed vs. elected officials) are captured by the indexes i = {Appointed,
Elected} and l = {Regulator, Judge}. The supervisors’ utility function is given by:

{

}

Ri ,l (ei ,l , S ) = 1 + τ (1 − SR ) H i (ei ,l ) − (1 − (1 − S ) J )C (ei ,l )  sˆ

(2)
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In equation (2), S is equal to 1 for a regulator and to 0 for a judge and τ measures
the strength of the career concerns. H i ( ei ,l ) differentiates elected and appointed
supervisors (here my reference is the Alesina and Tabellini [2005, a]’s model).
Elected ones want to be re-elected and this happens if ξ E ,l exceeds a threshold

ξ E ,l . This means that H E ( eE ,l ) = Pr {ξ E ,l ≥ ξ E ,l } . Voters are rational in the sense
that they understand that the alternative to the incumbent is another politician
with average talent who will achieve a precision ξ E ,l = (3 / 2)eEexp,l (where the apex

exp refers to the voters’ expectation). Therefore, it follows that: H E ( eE ,l ) = Pr {α ≥

}

≥ ( 3eEexp,l / 2eE ,l ) −1 . Appointed supervisors are career concerned and they want to

maximize the conditional perception of their ability. Employing E(·) (or, with a
slight abuse of notation, the apex exp) to indicate the evaluator’s expectation over
α given the performance realization and E to label the unconditional expectation

{

}

over ξ A,l . It follows that H A ( eA,l ) = E ( E (α ξ A,l ) ) = E (1 + α ) eA,l − eAexp,l  / eAexp,l and a
glance at H E ( i ) and H A ( i ) reveals how elected supervisors will exert more effort
than appointed ones.13 Finally in (2) R and J represent regulators and judges
specific parameters. They are defined on (0, 1). R captures the “revolving-door”
effect - regulators are attracted by job opportunities in the regulated industry -

13

In fact, the density of the Beta evaluated at the mean is always greater than 1 for all g and b

greater than 1. The relevant inequality (i.e., fα( α ) > 1) remains true for g ≠ b (asymmetric Beta)

and for all the other continuous distributions supported on a bounded interval (except for the
uninformative prior/uniform case when it holds as equality) when the hump-shape property is
imposed. Proofs are available upon request. The result becomes local for imperfect substitutability
between e and α (ξ = (α + Z)e). Here, I need: [Z + g/(g+b)] fα( α ) > [1 + Zg/(g+b)].
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while J formalizes the judges’ desire to leave a legacy of correctness (see Levy
[2005] for a similar treatment). The revolving door effect does not exist for ALJs.
In order to solve the model, I proceed by backward induction considering first the
supervisors’ effort choice and then the mechanism design problem faced by the
planner. The correct equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Equilibrium levels of effort can be ranked as follows: eˆE , J > eˆA, J and eˆE , R > eˆA, R
(see Guerriero [2006 a] for a proof). These levels are greater the more efficient
the supervision technology (higher K) is. At stage 2. the planner foresees the
supervisors’ moves and offers to the firm a menu of contracts contingent on the
eventual signals {σR, σJ} and fully characterized by the equilibrium levels of
effort. The planner’s posterior belief on β = β is: Pr( β = β / σ R = φ , σ J = φ ) =
= v (1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )) (1 − vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )) . Note how the expected ex ante probability that

the planner receives at least one informative signal γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) ≡ { E[ξ i , R (eˆi , R )] +
+ (1 − E[ξ i , R (eˆi , R )]) E[ξ i , J (eˆi , J )]} will be greater the higher K is and if supervisors are

elected. Define µ as the shadow cost of public funds. In the supervision regime
(note the apex S), the planner’s ex-post expected welfare function writes as:
 v (1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) )
 ˆS

ˆS ˆS
ˆS 
WPAI ,S = vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )W * + 1 − vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )  
V ( q ) − (1 + λ ) ( β − a ) q +ψ ( a )  +
ˆ
ˆ
γ
v
e
e
−
1
(
,
)
i,R i, J

−λΦ ( aˆ S )  +


1− v
V ( qˆ S ) − (1 + λ )  ( β − aˆ S )qˆ S + ψ ( aˆ S )    − 2(1 + µ ) sˆ .




1 − vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )


(3)

As usual, only the low type’s allocation-effort pair is distorted and I have that:
qˆ

S

= q * ( β − aˆ S )

ψ ′ ( aˆ

S

) = qˆ

S

i.e.,

( ) = cˆ

V ′ qˆ

S

S

= β − aˆ S ,

− ( λ 1 + λ ) ( v 1 − v ) (1 − γ ( eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) ) Φ ′ ( aˆ S ) .

(4)

In equation (4), the rule giving price as a function of marginal cost is the same of
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the full information case: incentive concerns are entirely taken care of by the costreimbursement rule. In order to lower the high type rent, the planner is forced to
distort the low type’s allocation away from the first best and towards low powered
(smaller aˆ S ) incentive schemes. A more efficient signal extraction technology

curbs such a distortion; moreover, implicit political incentives (election) for
supervisors act as substitute for costly explicit market incentives (COS) for the
regulated firm. The following proposition summarizes these findings:

Proposition 1: A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to the presence of
elected supervisors and more efficient supervision technologies (higher K). B. An
increase in the power of the incentive scheme lowers ex-ante regulated prices.
Proposition 1 extends the New Regulation Theory’s (Laffont and Tirole [1993])
insights to the more realistic framework with implicitly interested supervisors. At
this point, it is instructive to stress that the picture drawn in this section is at least
partially shaded. I assumed a myopic and public interested planner, but what
happens when concerns for the long run firm’s profitability appear on the scene?

3.1 Strategic Price Mechanisms Reforms
Following Laffont and Tirole [1993], a sharp tension between rent extraction and
investments arises in industrial policies: whether or not the planner can commit to
a contract contingent on the level of investments, equilibrium allocations can
envision ex post expropriation of sunk investments. In this sense, non-benevolent
supervisors may relax such a time inconsistency. The intuition proposes several
new questions: is it possible to think of the supervisors’ effort exertion as a
pandering activity when investments are taken into consideration? How much
partisan planners care about investment’s decision by the regulated firm in

14
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selecting incentive schemes? How much is this choice driven by efficiency
evaluations and how strong are the rent seeking forces? A first set of answers
arise naturally when the above model is bridged to the parallel analysis in Laffont
and Tirole [1993]. Before stage 1., the firm fixes the level of a non contractible
investment of cost I that increases of ζ(I) the probability that a high type is drawn.
Assume that ζ ′(i) > 0, ζ ′′(i) < 0, lim I = ∞, v = (1 − v) / v and ζ ′(i) > 1 (v∆θ ) (i.e.,
I →ζ −1 ( v )

investments are effective enough). The planner lacks commitment but anticipates
the optimal I (i.e., I*). In the investment regime (note the additional apex I), ex
ante the firm maximizes its expected ex post rent minus investment costs:

{

I * ∈ arg max I ≥ 0 v (1 + ζ ( I ))[1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]Φ ( aˆ S , I ( I * )) − I

}

(5)

The firm underinvests with respect to the social optimum (see Appendix 6.2 for a
revealed preference argument) and a glance at expression (5) suggests that the
extent of inefficiency is higher the more precise the planner’s signal is and the
less powered the incentive scheme is.14 Fixed-price contracts reach efficiency but
leave a disproportionately high rent to the high type. So the supervisors’ signal
extraction activity can assume a pandering feature when effort is driven more by
career concerns than by a farsighted interest in the market’s efficiency and a
planner caring enough about cost-reducing investments, because faced with a high
cost market, prefers a high-powered rules. The following proposition summarizes:

Proposition 2: Investment-concerned planners prefer higher powered incentive
rules if faced with high cost industries.

14

A similar effect is studied in Sappington [1986] who shows how an institution preventing the

regulator from observing the firm’s true cost is optimal when investments’ expropriation is a real
concern. Here, PBRs and the appointment rule for supervisors cover the same role.
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This inefficiency is even stronger when investments are directed towards
reliability and quality services. In fact, these activities do not lower the firm’s cost
but increase its long run profits: evidently also a conflict between consumers’
groups arises here. To capture this, I assume that the constitutional reform is
decided by the incumbent among two parties: one more pro-shareholders R
(Republican) and one more pro-consumers D (Democratic). Between stages 1.
and 2., each party faces an election with winning probability xj (j = [D, R]) and
decides, if it is the winner, the size of ρj, an instrument increasing the
investment’s utility for the firm ( G ( I , ρˆ j ) ). A type j planner attaches a weight χ J
to G (i) and a weight χj to G (i) . The weights are such that χ R = 1 + 2 d , χ D = 1 + d ,
χ R = 2 d − 1 , χ R = d − 1 where d > λ represents the extent of party policy

differences. A Republican planner values more I and dislikes less an increase in
the firm’s rent. Define I * (aˆ S , I (i ), ρˆ j ) ≡ I (i, j ) . The firm is risk averse towards non
cost-reducing investments and the following holds:
G1 > 0, G11 < 0, G11 < 0, G 2 > 0, G 22 < 0, G12 > 0, G 21 > 0, G111 G112 ≥ G11 G12 and
 G 11 ( I ( i , R ), ρˆ j ) ∂ I ( i , R ) ∂ a

S ,I

  G 11 ( I ( i , D ), ρˆ j ) ∂ I ( i , D ) ∂ a

S ,I

 ≥ 1

(6)

Before stage 3., the firm chooses the non-observable and non-contractible I as to
maximize its expected ex post utility subject to the budget constraint:
I * arg max I ≥0 {G( I , ρˆ j ) + tˆ −ψ ( aˆ S , I )} s.t.: A + ( p − c)q ≥ t + I .

(7)

I* is a function of the incentive scheme’s power and of both ρj and d. The optimal
ρj is such that ρˆ R > ρˆ D . It follows that: I1* (aˆ S , I , ρˆ R ) ≥ I1* (aˆ S , I , ρˆ D ) ≥ 0 . Let me focus
on regimes in which supervisors share the same selection rule and define:

γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) ≡ γ (i ) ;

I(i, j ) ≡ I * (i, − j ) + x j ( I * (i, j ) − I * (i, − j )) ;
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G (i, j ) ≡ G (i , − j ) + x j (G (i, j ) − G (i, − j ))

G ( I * (i , j ), ρˆ j ) ≡ G (i , j ) ;

and ο as the shadow price of the moral hazard in investment constraint (first order
condition of (7)). A type j planner’s ex post expected welfare function writes as:

(

)

W jAI ,S , I (i, j ) = WPAI , S (i) + vγ (i) (1 + λ + χ j )G (i, j ) + ( χ j − 1 − λ ) I (i, j )  − ο 1 − ∂G (i, j) ∂I .

On top of it, the low type’s equilibrium effort is given by: ψ ′ ( aˆ
= qˆ S , I −

{

1
1
v γ ( i )  λ Φ ′ ( aˆ
1+ λ 1− v

− ( χ j − 1 − λ ) ∂ I ( i , j ) ∂ a

S ,I

S ,I

S ,I

)=

) − (1 + λ + χ j ) ∂ G ( i , j ) ∂ a

 + ο  ∂ 2 G ( i , j ) ∂ I ∂ a

S ,I

S ,I

+

}

 .

(8)

Non contractibility of investment along with a sharp conflict among different
consumer groups generates the last three positive terms in the cost-reimbursement
rule. These terms are affected by both the party policy distance d and the holding
on power xj: partisan planners will take into account the political uncertainty and
select the power of the incentive scheme according to the consequences that
expropriation has on their constituency.15 The straightforward comparative statics
of equation (8) with respect to {d , x j , J }
implies the following patterns:
j =D,R

Proposition 3: A. The likelihood of a reform towards more powerful incentive
schemes is higher the larger party policy differences are and the higher (lower)
the holding on power is if the reformer is Republican (Democratic). B. Higher
powered incentive schemes are more likely if the reformer is Republican.
Such a strategic institutional design explanation extends to the incentive schemes’
reform the intuition suggested by Guerriero [2006 a] for the supervisors’ selection

15

Several studies demonstrate that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to

implement institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to impose constraints on
future incumbents (see Persson and Svensson [1988] and Tabellini and Alesina [1990]).
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rules constitutional reforms. It is worth to emphasize how sharp is the difference
of these results compared with the seminal analysis in Laffont [1996]. There the
relation between PBRs reforms and the holding on power was negative when the
incumbent reformer is Republican and null when the reformer is Democratic.
Clearly enough, when high powered schemes leave positive rents in equilibrium,
new resources are in the hands of the regulated firm and the fear of supervisors’
capture becomes a real concern. To this extent, the following section proposes a
few interesting remarks about the impact on the above model of the action of an
organized group interested in maximizing the regulated firm’s rent.

3.2 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribing
Both ALJs and PUC’s commissioners exert effort in other tasks. As seen above,
examples are the control of bypassing by non-regulated utilities and the analysis
of environmental regulation. The organized group want to relax the supervision
constraint offering side-contracts conditional on this second effort level supposed
(as in Alesina and Tabellini [2005 a]) observable and contractible.16 The interest
group has all the bargaining power and influences supervisors, one at the time,
either directly (bribes) or indirectly (campaign contributions) just before the
supervision effort is decided in stages 3. or in 4.. Let me assume that the level of
performance from the extra task h brings a small positive extra-utility to the firm
but implies a relevant cost (in terms of effort) to the supervisor (i.e., the effort
cost function C ( ei ,l + eih,l ) is non-divisible). It turns out that in a jointly optimal

16

Here I take aside the eventual multiple principals-multiple agents’ strategic interaction, i.e. cost

minimization across supervisors’ side payments. This remains as open agenda for future research.
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equilibrium eˆi ,l = 0 so that the high type’s firm enjoys a higher informational rent
(proofs are available upon request). Even if discouraging, these equilibria are
fragile and the following remarks apply: 1 Bribes do not arise if the punishment
that a supervisor receives if caught is high enough; 2 Campaign contributions,
although legal, would be not even affordable for the interest group, which has to
reimburse supervisors for the entire amount of implicit incentives (this is due to
the precision’s multiplicative technology). Thus, provided that implicit incentives
are strong enough (i.e., high enough values of τ, R and J in (2)) the model remains
robust to the introduction of lobbying and bribing. At this point, the other main
contribution of the paper is to face the model with U.S. electricity market’s data.

4. Evidence
The empirical questions I want to answer are: what forces have significantly
shaped the reforming planners’ incentives at the constitutional tables? How strong
were the political positions and how relevant the efficiency reasons? Can the data
reveal the extent of substitutability between market and political institutions?
What is the relation between PBRs reforms, considered as endogenous, and
regulated prices? Based on the theoretical propositions, the following Empirical
Predictions formulates such questions as testable empirical predictions:

Empirical Predictions: 1. A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to more
efficient supervision technologies, high cost industries and elected supervisors. B.
High powered incentive schemes are more likely with Republican reformers the
larger party policy differences are and the higher (lower) the incumbent holding
on power is if the reforming party is Republican (Democratic).
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2. High powered incentive schemes lower the level of equilibrium prices.
While Table 1 reports variables’ names and construction, Table 2.A and 2.B show
how, between 1982 and 2002, 41 of the 144 major IOUs operating in the US
electric power market switched to some kind of PBRs. This enormous wave of
reforms has interested 25 of the 49 continental US states and represents a perfect
source of variation for a panel analysis. Besides, following Persson and Tabellini
[2003], another justification to a panel approach is that cross sectional models
would deliver fragile inference given the “non-random pattern of constitutional
reforms and the extensive differences among [individuals] belonging to different
constitutional groups.” Therefore, I will make use of two main models for
evaluating points 1. and 2. (respectively) of the Empirical Predictions: a random
effects logit with dependent variable a performance-based regulation dummy and
a panel pass-trough pricing equation.

4.1 Non Random Constitution Selection
First of all, let me define institutions. The high powered incentive schemes’
dummy (PBR_F and PBR) takes value 1 if the firm (or at least one firm within the
state) adopts a broadly defined performance based regulation (rate freeze, price or
revenue cap with possible earnings sharing)17 and 0 otherwise (COS). To capture
the power of the supervisors’ implicit incentives, the party policy differences and
the efficiency of the production and signal extraction technologies, I will make
use of several proxies. Implicit incentives are captured by Jud_Elec (an elected
judges’ dummy) and Reg_Elec (an elected regulators’ binary). The party policy

17

See Sappington et al. [2001] for a definition of each scheme.
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distance is measured by the absolute difference in the percentage of seats held by
Democrats and Republicans (Av_Dist); while the average percentage of seats held
by the majority party (Av_Maj) is the proxy chosen for the incumbent’s holding
on power (see Hanssen [2004, b]). Creating a proxy for the efficiency of the
supervision technology is a more complex task. My strategy is to use the two sets
of observables that more likely enhance the likelihood of information extraction:
proxies for the presence of powerful watchdog groups and measures of the
amount of staff’s resources. The first group includes: Young (proportion aged 517), Ind and Res (proportion of revenues form sales to industrial and residential
users respectively). The second set is composed by Budget (PUC’s staff budget)
and Employ (the number of permanent staff’s members). The latter, unfortunately,
is a very crude measure for efficiency. Varied and unobservable (in my data)
skills are required to the PUC’s members so it is not clear if higher values of
Employ assure a more precise signal or instead relax the assumed staff’s
benevolence. Investments’ concerns are reasonably linked to costly generation
(cst) and more crudely to high residential prices (Rkhr). Generations by nuclear
and fuel sources (Gen_Fuel, Gen_Nucl) are introduced (one at the time to avoid
multicollinearity) in the specification in order to control for difference in
generation sources and federal policies across states. Other controls are state
population (Pop), income (Income) and electricity sales (Sales). Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3 reproduce the estimates of a random effect Logit model with
dependent variable PBR for a panel of 49 states over the samples 1970-1997 and
1980-1997. This second breakdown shows how the results are affected when the
Embargo shocks years are excluded. Moreover, column (3) reports the estimates
when the same model is ran for a panel of 143 firms located in the same 49 states
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over the 1980-1997 period. Here, the right hand side variables vary only across
states and time: identification is obtained through the firms specific random
effects. The evidence strongly supports the model’s predictions. For what concern
the proxies for the holding on power, the results clearly lean towards the strategic
use explanation: the holding on power increases the probability18 of the
introduction of PBRs if interacted with Rep while the sign of Av_Maj is negative
within the Democratic incumbents’ group. Republican incumbent are more likely
to introduce PBRs.19 All the proxies are generally highly significant. A bit more
mixed is the evidence on the efficiency of the signal extraction technology. The
relevant proxies show the correct sign except Employ always negative and Res
and Ind negative in columns (2) and (3). While the first sign comes at no surprise
given the above remark, an appealing explanation for the last two is that, in a
dynamic set up, the friction between supervisors and interested parties would
become so sour to deteriorate the quality of the signal. Finally, high marginal
costs (investment concerns) increase the attractiveness of high powered costreimbursement rules. All these findings are insensible to the sample choice.
Finally, looking at selection rules, it is clear (even if Jud_Elec is negative in
column (2)) how the planner tends to substitute costly rent-extraction incentives
(COS) with accountability-driving institutions. The regulators selection rule
seems to cover a more relevant role in such a substitution pattern. The

18

To be precise, each coefficient reported in columns (1)-(3) measures the effect on the logarithm

of the odds ratio (for the event PBR ) of a unit increase in one of the right hand side variables.
19

The impact of an incumbent Republican reformer is given by the sum of the coefficient on Rep

plus the coefficient on PBR*Rep multiplied for the mean of Rep. In columns (1) and (3) these
figures are respectively: 4.26 = – 25.54 + 44.48*0.67 and 3.46 = – 18.839 + 34.836*0.64.
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consideration of the reforms’ timing as dependent variable confirms this finding.20
Column (4) shows the estimates of an exponential proportional hazards model
with failure event identified by PBR_F. Jud_Elec is negative and not statistically
significant. All the other points of the Empirical Predictions continue to hold. In
interpreting column (4)‘s figures, remember that the effect of a unit increase in
one of the right hand side variables (say cst) is to increase the hazard of PBR_F
(i.e., the instantaneous probability of a reform given that COS was in place) by a
factor equal to the exponential of the estimated coefficient attached to that
variable (i.e., exp(1.064)).21 At this point, a natural question arises: what are the
effects of PBRs’ reforms on regulatory performances (i.e., prices)?

4.2 Pricing Models
Recent cross-states empirical analyses, mainly based on telecommunications data,
have delivered the following stylized facts: PBRs assure lower prices and higher
earnings with no relevant reduction in overall service quality.22 What this
literature lacks is an endogenous treatment of the regulatory institutions: as
follows I will fill this hole. The specification relates electricity prices charged at

20

However, the log-rank test significantly (at 5%) rejects the equality of the survivor functions

across electing and appointing groups for both selection rule breakdowns.
21

The results are not sensible to the specific parametric form imposed to the underlying hazard

function. Besides, the Cox proportional hazards model delivers a very similar output.
22

See Sappington et al. [2001] and Kridel et al. [1996] for complete reviews of the empirical

literature. Hill [1995]’s and Joskow [2006]’s reviews focus on electric power market studies.
Recently a wide cross-countries literature has been interested in the relative performances of
benchmarking techniques applied to electric utilities (see Jamasb and Pollitt [2000]).
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state level to various cost items plus fixed effect terms for regulatory regimes.
Utilities set prices at system wide average costs and the more considerable
component of such costs is the fossil fuels’ item. The latter is useful in assessing
the pass-through of cost shocks into prices and it helps in controlling the
differences in the production structures. Therefore, I test point 2. of the Empirical
Predictions running, for each customer class, the following panel regressions:
ps ,t = η s + ϑt + φ1 Reg _ Elecs ,t + φ2 Jud _ Elecs ,t + φ3 PBRs ,t +

+υ1 PBRs ,t cs ,t + υ2 Jud _ Elecs ,t cs ,t + υ3cs ,t + ϕ Cons ,t + ε s ,t .

(9)

In equation (9) ps ,t is a price for state s in year t; ηs are state fixed effects
controlling for long-run differences in production and distribution systems; ϑt are
year dummies picking up macro-shocks and common changes in federal policy;
Cons ,t includes state specific time varying controls (Gen_Fuel, Gen_Nucl,

Income, Income2, Pop, Pop2, Sales) and proxies for the efficiency of the
supervision technology (Res, Ind, Young, Budget, Employ). PBRs ,t , Jud _ Elecs ,t
and Reg _ Elecs ,t represent the time varying dummies for PBRs and election rules
respectively. Table 4 reports the main figures. The model has always an
explanatory power higher than 85% and all the proxies for the efficiency of the
supervision technology (not shown) are highly significant and generally have an
attached coefficient with the correct sign. When Jud _ Elecs ,t is included, fossil
fuels’ costs interacted with PBRs ,t have always a negative but never significant
marginal effect. The high significance of Jud _ Elecs ,t suggests that implicit
political incentives are more effective: this would also offer an appealing
justification to the lags in the introduction of PBRs in the U.S.. The direct effect
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of PBRs ,t is both significant and positive on residential and commercial rates.
Given the endogeneity of cost-reimbursement rules (see section 4.1), can these
results be driven by a failure in conditional independence? Table 5 addresses such
a question. Here, (9) is estimated with the Arellano-Bond procedure without fixed
effects but with one lag of the dependent variable; Av_Maj, Rep, Av_Maj*Rep
only are employed as extra instruments to avoid weak instrumentation. As

columns (1), (2) and (3) show the indirect effect of PBRs ,t is not significant but
now null; the direct effect becomes negative: OLS seems to overestimate the
overall impact of the reform towards more powerful schemes. This has a
significant (at 10%) direct marginal negative effect on residential prices implying
a 2.5% reduction on residential bills over the 1970-1997 sample. The weak
significance is mainly due to the presence of the first lag of prices. Finally, note
that the over-identifying restrictions are never rejected.

5. Concluding Remarks
As the theoretic section explains price-cap and COS arbitrate the rent extractionefficiency trade-off in different ways. Partisan planners not only take into account
the comparative advantages of different rules but they also use high powered
schemes to strategically tie the hands of new incumbents’ parties. I test these
propositions on a panel of U.S. states. The results show how the probability of a
reform from a low powered incentive scheme to a higher powered one has been
linked to Republican incumbents, larger party policy differences, high cost
industry structures, the presence of a more efficient supervision technology and
elected supervisors. This evidence is robust to different estimation procedures and
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to the consideration of the reforms timing as dependent variable. Less clear are
the findings concerning the relation between regulated prices and PBRs. OLS
overestimate the negative marginal effect of the reform, which is statistically
significant for residential rates only. Such a point remains as open agenda for
future studies on the field along with a multidimensional analysis of differently
powered incentive rules.23 All in all, the empirical section rationalizes the great
wave of change that has interested the market during the last decades and shows
how, at the constitutional table, partisan planners have substituted, according to
their own partisan interests, explicit market’s incentives (COS) with implicit
accountability ones (election).
On top of it, my analysis delivers three main points to be seriously considered by
actual constitutional designers: 1. the importance of a careful assessment of the
benefits linked to high powered incentive schemes when expropriation of
investment is a real concern; 2. the relevance of a deep evaluation of the effective
efficiency of the signal extraction technology (i.e., extent of participation of
watchdog groups and regulatory agencies’ resources) when regulatory reforms are
put in place; 3. the welfare gains related to a Constitutional table insulated from
short-term electoral boosts when the delicate incentive schemes-institutional
designs mix has to be decided.

23

When I employ a multinomial Logit and an ordered Logit estimator, the main results remain

unchanged. The dependent variable of the multinomial Logit is set equal to 1 if a COS regulation
is employed, 3 if a pure price cap is in use and 2 if any other PBRs’ scheme is adopted.
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Tables Legend
Preliminary Analysis
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Table 2.A: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).
Table 2.B: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).
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Pricing Equations
Table 4: Results on Pass-Through - Fixed Time/State Effects Estimates.
Table 5: Results on Pass-Through - Arellano-Bond Estimates.

6. Appendix
6.1 Solution without Supervision and Investment Concerns
Maximizing (1) with respect of U, e and q yields the following:
1. The existence of the shadow cost of rewards implies no rent for the firm:
U=0

or

t ≡ ψ(a*);

2. The disutility of effort is equalized to the saving in average cost at the margin:

ψ′ (a) = q*

or

a ≡ a*;

3. The social marginal value and cost of output are equalized:
V′ (q) = (1+λ) (β – a)

or

S′ (q) = p = c.
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A price–cap gives the right incentives for cost reduction and the fixed charge C* can be
tailored to fully extract the firm’s rent. In such a “selling the store” mechanism, the price
(PC stands for price cap) is implicitly defined as follows:
t ≡ A + pPCq(pPC) – C(q(pPC)) = S′ (q(·)) – C(q(·)) = d – (C(q(·)) – C*)
where d = ψ(a*). The firm chooses a in order to maximize d – ((β – a)q – C*) – ψ(a ).24■

6.2 Underinvestment When the Planner Cannot Commit
The socially optimal Iˆ minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs:

Iˆ ∈ arg min I I + v(1 + ζ ( I )) β + [1 − v(1 + ζ ( I ))] β = I + β − v(1 + ζ ( I ))∆β

(10)

This amounts to say that the objective in (10) assumes a value greater at I* than at Iˆ .
Evidently, the same can be said for the objective function in (5). Once I sum these two
inequalities, the following expression holds in equilibrium:

I * + β − v(1 + ζ ( I * ))∆β + v(1 + ζ ( I * ))[1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]Φ(a ( I * )) − I * ≥
Iˆ + β − v(1 + ζ ( Iˆ))∆β + v(1 + ζ ( Iˆ))[1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]Φ(a ( I * )) − Iˆ
or v (ζ ( Iˆ) − ζ ( I * )) {∆β − [1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]Φ (a ( I * ))} ≥ 0 . Given the properties of ζ ′(i) and
the first order condition of (5), this inequality is met for ζ ( Iˆ) ≥ ζ ( I * ) or I * ≤ Iˆ . If, as it
is likely, the cost of investment is lower in low cost markets, Proposition 2 follows.

■

6.3 Data
This analysis exploits both cross sectional and time variation in the data. Three are the
main data sets: a panel of 49 states for the samples 1970-1997 (1372 observations) and
1980-1997 (888 observations) and a panel of 143 firms over the same 49 states over the
period 1980-1997 (2574 observations). Nebraska has been excluded because it has no

24

Note that, as long as the planner knows β , she can infer effort from the observation of cost.
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investor–owned utilities while the District of Columbia (and consequently the Potomac
Electric Power Company) is not considered because no data points are available before
1987. Unbalanced panels deliver similar results.

B.1 Data on incentive schemes are directly collected from:
B.1.1 EEI, [2000], PBR Survey (Member Survey), EEI, Washington D.C.
B.1.2 Sappington, D. E.M., J. P. Pfeifenberger, P. H. and G. N. Basheda, [2001].

B.2 Data on electric prices, generation and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net
Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook:
EEI, [1995], 1960-1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry;
EEI, [1993-1997], Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry, Washington DC.
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA,
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Prices are calculated from the revenues and
sales in terms of cents per Kwh. Residential, commercial and industrial users account for
the 95% of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy for generation
in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the generator and by
energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the second one.

B.3 To construct the fossil fuel cost index for state i in year t, let sjit be the share of
energy source j in state i in year t and let pit be the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net
Kwh (in cents per Kwh) for state i in year t, calculated as: pit = Σj (qjit/qit) pijt. Then the
fossil fuel cost series will be given by cit = Σj sjit pit where sit is the share of electricity
produced in state i in year t by the fossil fuel energy sources j (i.e.: coal, gas and oil).

B.4 Data on regulatory selection rules, PUCs’ budgets and number of PUCs’ full time
employees are collected directly from:
NARUC, [1970-1997], Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies, NARUC, Washington DC.

B.5 Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks:
CSG, [1970-1997], The Book of the States, CSG, Lexington, KY.
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B.6 Data on judges’ selection rule and length terms are collected from Hanssen, F.
Andrew [2004, Table 1] and Besley, Timothy and A. Abigail Payne, [2003, Table 1].

B.7 State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 517 are calculated from a U.S. Census Bureau (UCB) publication:

UCB, [1970-1997], Population Estimates Program, UCB, Washington DC.

6.4 Tables

Preliminary Analysis
Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions.
Variables

Pricing Rules

PBR

Prices

Rkhr/c/i
Av_Maj:

Political
Variables

Description
Dummy taking value 1 if the rule is in use in the state, 0 otherwise.
(PBR_F = Dummy taking value 1 if the firm uses the rule, 0
otherwise).
Revenue per Kwh sales (residential, commercial, industrial).
Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by
majority party.

Av_Dist:

Absolute difference between percentage of seats held by Democrats
and Republicans.

Rep:
Reg_Elec:

Dummy taking value 1 if the government is Republican, 0 otherwise.
Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected, 0 otherwise.

Jud_Elec:
Budget:

Dummy taking value 1 if judges are elected, 0 otherwise.
PUC’s total receipts in thousands dollars.

Employ:
Over_65:

PUC’s full time employees.
Percentage of population aged 65 and over.

Young:

Percentage of population aged 5-17.

Res:

Percentage of Sales from customers who are residential.

Ind:
cst:
Gen_Fuel:

Percentage of Sales from customers, which are industrial.
Cost of fossil fuels (in cents per Kwh sales) – see Appendix 6.2.
Percentage of total generation from fossil fuels sources.

Gen_Nucl:

Percentage of total generation from nuclear source.

Sales:

Sales in thousands Mwh.

Pop:

State population in thousands people.

Income:

State income in thousands dollars.

Selection Rules

Supervision
Technology

Watchdog
Groups

Average Cost

Other Controls
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Table 2.A: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).
States
AL

AZ

AR

CA

CO

CT

DE
DC

FL

GA

HI

ID

IL

IN

IA

KS

KY

LA

ME

MD

MA

MI

MN

MS

MO

MT
NV

IOUs
AL Po. Co. ;
AZ Pu. Se. Co. ,
Tucson El. Po. Co.;
Entergy AR Inc. ;
Pacific Gas & El. Co. ,
San Diego Gas & El. Co. , *
Southern CA Edison;*
Pu. Se. Co. of CO;*
Citizen Utilities Co. ,
CT Light & Po. Co. ,*
United Illuminating Co. ;
Delmarva Po. & Light Co.;
Potomac El. Po. Co.;
FL Po. & Light Co. ,
FL Po. Co. ,
Gulf Po. Co. ,
Tampa El. Co. ;*
GA Po. Co. ,
Savannah El. & Po. Co. ;
HI El. ,*
Maui El. Co. Ltd. ;
ID Po. Co. ;
Central IL Light Co. ,
Central IL Pu. Se. Co. ,*
Commonwealth Edison Co. ,
IL Po. Co. ,
Mt. Carmel Pu. Se. Co. ;
IN Michigan Po. Co. ,
Indianapolis Po. & Light Co. ,
Northern In. Pu.Se.Co. ,
PSI Energy Inc. ,
Southern IN Gas & El. Co. ;
Interstate Po. Co. ,
IES Ut. Inc. ,
MidAmerican Energy Co.;*
KS Gas & El.Co.,
Western Resources Inc.;
KY.Po. Co. ,
KY Ut. Co. ,
Louisville Gas & El. Co. ,*
Union Light Heat & Po. Co.;
Central LA Inc. ,
Entergy LA Inc. ,*
Entergy New Orleans Inc. ,
Southwestern El. Po. Co. ;
Bangor Hydro-El. Co. ,
Central ME Po. Co. ,
ME Pu. Se. Co. ;*
Baltimore Gas & El. Co. ,*
Potomac El. Co.;*
Boston Edison Co. ,
Cambridge El. Light Co. ,
Commonwealth El. Co. ,
Eastern Edison Co. ,*
Fitchburg Gas & El. Light Co. ,
MA El. Co. ,
Western MA. El. Co. ;*
Consumers Energy Co. ,
Detroit Edison Co. ,
Edison Sault El. Co. ,
Upper Peninsula Po.Co. ;
MN Po. & Light Co.,
Northern State Po. Co. ,
Otter Tail Po. Co.;*
Entergy MS Po. Co. ,*
MS Po. Co.;*
Empire District El. Co. ,
Kansas City Po. & Light Co. ,
St Joseph Light & Po. Co. ,
Union El. Co. ,*
UtilCorp United Co.;
MT Po. Co. ;*
NV Po. Co. ,

PBR
Rate case moratorium;
None,
None;
None;
None,
Revenue and price cap with earnings sharing (see also case A.98-01-014),
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case A.93-12-029);
Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing (see also case 95A and 99A-531EG);
None,
Price cap (see also case 99-06-21 filed in 2000),
None;
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
Rate freeze with earnings sharing;
None,
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 96-0493 filed 1996),
None;
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None;
None,
None,
Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing (see also APP-96-1, RPU-96-8);
None,
None;
None,
None,
Revenue sharing (see also case 98-426/7 filed in 1998),
None;
None,
Rate case moratorium with earning sharing (see also case U-20925 filed in 1996),
None,
None;
Rate freeze for distribution services,
Revenue-per-customer cap and price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing;
Price cap (see also case 8794/8804 filed in 1998),
Price cap and rate freeze (see also case 8796 filed in 1999);
None,
None,
None,
Revenues sharing (see also case 96/94 filed in 1998),
None,
Rate freeze with earning sharing,
Revenue sharing (see also case 97-120 filed in 1998);
None,
None,
None,
None;
None,
Price cap with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing;
Benchmarks (see also case 93-UA-301 filed in 1994),
Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing;
None,
None,
None,
Rate freeze with earnings sharing (see also case EM-96-149 filed in 1997),
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also D95.9.128 filed 1996);
None;

Period
1982-2002

1994-2002
1997-2001
1996-2006

2000-2001

1995-1999

1997-1999

1998-2002
1998-2002
1998-2002
1998-2002
1998-2002

1998-2000

1999-2000

1996-2002

1995-2000
1991-2007
1996-2000
1998-2002
2000-2002

1998-2000
1998-2009
1998-2000

2001-2005
2001-2005
1994-1998
1995-2001

1995-2001

1997-1998
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Table 2.B: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002).
States
IOUs
NV Sierra Pacific Po. Co.;
NH Pu. Se. Co. of NH;

NJ

NM

NY

NC

ND

OH

OK

OR

PA

RI

SC

SD

TN

TX

VT

VA

WA

WV

WI

Atlantic City El. Co. ,
Jersey Central Po. & Light Co. ,
Pu. Se. El. & Gas Co. ,
Rockland El. Co.;
Pu. Se. Co. of NM;
Central Hudson Gas & El. Co. ,
Consolidated Edison Co.– NY Inc. ,
Long Island Lighting Co. ,
NY State El. & Gas Co. ,*
Niagara Mohawk Po. Co. ,*
Orange & Rockland Utils Inc.,
Rochester Gas and El. Co.;*
Carolina Po. & Light Co. ,
Duke Po. Co. ,
Nanthala o. & Light Co.;
MDU Resources Group Inc.;
Cincinnati Gas & El. Co. ,
Cleveland El. Illumination Co. ,
Columbus Southern Po. Co. ,
Dayton Po. & Light Co. ,
OH Edison Co. ,
OH Po. Co. ,
Toledo Edison Co. ;
OK Gas & El. Co. ,
Pu. Se. Co. of OK ;
PacifiCorp ,*
Portland General El. Co. ;
Duquesne Light Co. ,
Metropolitan Edison Co. ,
PA El. Co. ,
PA Po. & Light Co. ,
PA Po. Co. ,
PECO Energy Co. ,
West Penn Power Co. ;
Blackstone Valley Electric Co. ,*
Narragansett Electric Co. ,*
Newport Electric Co. ;*
Lockhart Power Co. ,
SC El. & Gas Co. ;
Black Hills Co. ;
Northwestern Pu. Se. Co. ;
Kingsport Po. Co. ;
Central Po. & Light Co. ,
El Paso El. Co. ,
Entergy Gulf States Inc. ,
Houston Lighting & Po. Co. ,
Southwestern El. Se. Co. ,
Southwestern Pu. Se. Co. ,
TX Utilities Electric Co. ,*
TX-New Mexico Power Co. ,*
West TX Ut. Co. ;
Central VT Pu. Se. Co. ,
Green Mountain Po. Co. ;
Appalachian Po. Co. ,
VA Electric & Po. Co. ;
Puget Sound Energy
Washington Water Po. Co. ;
Monongahela Po. Co. ,
Wheeling Po. Co. ;
Consolidated Water Po. Co. ,
Madison Gas & El. Co. ,
Northern States Po. Co. ,
Northwestern WI El. Co. ,
Pioneer Po. & Light Co. ,
South Beloit Water Gas & El. Co. ,
Superior Water Light & Po. Co. ,
WI El. Po. Co. ,
WI Po. & Light Co. ,
WI Pu. Se. Co. .

PBR
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
None;
None;
None,
Revenue-per-customer cap with earnings sharing,
None,
Price-cap (for base rates) with earnings sharing (see also case 96-E-0891),
Revenue cap and rate freeze- price cap,
None,
Revenue capand rate case moratorium with earnings sharing;
None,
None,
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None;
None,
None;
Price and revenue cap with earnings sharing,
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None;
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 2498/2514 filed in 1996),
Price cap and rate freeze with earnings sharing,
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 2498/2514 filed in 1996);
None,
None;
Rate freeze (see also case EL95-003 filed in 1995),
None;
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
Benchmarks (see also case 21112),
Benchmarks,
None;
None,
None;
None,
None;
Price cap,
None;
None,
None;
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None,
None.

Period

1995-2005
1993-2002
1991-2002
1993-2002

1994-2001

1997-1998
1997-1998
1997-2004

1995-2005

2000-2002
2000-2002

1997-2001

Notes: 1. El., Inc., Po., Pu., Se. are for respectively Company, Electric, Incorporation, Power, Public, Service;
2. IOUs included in the EEI report show the * index;
3. Relevant PUC’s docket in parentheses.
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Non Random Constitution Selection

Table 3: Determinants of Incentive Schemes - RE Logit Estimates.
Dependent Var.:
Av_Maj

Av_Maj*Rep

Rep

Av_Dist

Reg_Elec

Jud_Elec

Budget

Employ

Res

Ind

Young

cst

(1)
PBR

(2)
PBR

(3)
PBR_F

(4)
PBR_F

- 4.164
(17.767)
44.479
(16.949)***
- 25.536
(10.777)**
5.781
(8.578)
18.322
(5.364)***
3.566
(1.963)*
0.00010
(0.00004)***
- 0.022
(0.0083)***
229.258
(66.781)***
16.025
(12.291)
1.537
(0.465)***

- 80.175
(38.534)**
207.118
(75.047)***
- 92.575
(34.317)***
34.969
(13.700)***
73.655
(27.132)***
- 19.962
(7.492)***
0.00040
(0.00015)***
- 0.041
(0.016)**
- 130.166
(57.182)**
- 69.580
(43.204)
4.860
(1.775)***

- 1.399
(17.829)*
34.836
(11.000)***
- 18.839
(6.999)***
- 0.474
(7.514)
7.273
(2.118)***
5.112
(2.092)**
0.00004
(0.00001)***
- 0.046
(0.0077)
- 46.517
(16.193)***
- 42.243
(13.041)***
0.290
(0.134)**

- 5.024
(5.024)
9.107
(4.107)**
- 5.716
(2.735)**
2.867
(2.306)
1.242
(0.589)**
- 0.513
(0.706)
6.34e-06
(4.92e-06)
-0.001
(0.002)
- 9.236
(7.086)
- 7.178
(4.737)
0.187
(0.056)***

4.203
(1.400)***

6.906
(3.844)*

2.298
(0.524)***

Rkhr

Gen_Nucl

- 14.211
(6.277)**

Gen_Fuel

Sales

Income

Pop

Constant

Estimation

1.064
(0.346)***

0.0002
(0.00007)***
0.0020
(0.0006)***
- 2.47e-08
(1.38e-07)
- 206.191
(58.931)***
Random Effects
Logit
1372
- 58.469

- 122.461
(44.931)***
0.0003
(0.0001)***
0.005
(0.002)***
- 7.57e-07
(3.35e-07)**
- 94.809
(46.043)**
Random Effects
Logit
882
- 45.212

- 8.234
(2.787)***
- 0.00008
(0.00003)**
0.0014
(0.0003)***
4.53e-07
(1.38e-07)***
- 45.523
(18.676)**
Random Effects
Logit
2574
- 106.497

N. of Obs.
Log Likelihood
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;
3. The dependent variable in column 4 represents the failure event.

- 4.448
(1.337)***
1.49e-06
(7.84e-06)
0.00003
(0.00005)
3.28e-08
(7.79e-08)
1.758
(5.424)
Exponential
Proport. Hazards
2515
- 35.795
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Pricing Equations
Table 4: Results on Pass-Through - Fixed Time/State Effects Estimates.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Rkhr
Rkhc
Rkhi
0.457
0.540
0.203
(0.182)**
(0.181)***
(0.149)
-0.092
0.186
0.043
Reg_Elecst
(0.203)
(0.201)
(0.165)
-0.091
-0.214
0.171
Jud_Elecst
(0.158)
(0.156)
(0.129)
PBRst .cst
-0.001
-0.159
-0.068
(0.125)
(0.124)
(0.102)
-0.394
-0.366
-0.302
Jud_Elecst .cst
(0.082)***
(0.082)***
(0.067)***
0.542
0.498
0.470
cst
(0.054)***
(0.053)***
(0.044)***
Budgetst , Employst , Resst , Indst , Youngst , Gen_Fuelst ,
Other Controls
Gen_Nuclst , Popst , (Popst)2 , Incomest , (Incomest)2 , Salesst .
Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator.
Estimation
1372
1372
1372
N. of Obs.
0.89
0.87
0.85
R2
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Dependent Var.:
PBRst

Table 5: Results on Pass-Through - Arellano-Bond Estimates.
Dependent Var.:
PBRst

PBRst .cst

Other Controls

(1)
(2)
(3)
Rkhr
Rkhc
Rkhi
-0.189
0.069
- 0.023
(0.106)*
(0.137)
(0.123)
0.082
0.025
0.034
(0.066)
(0.076)
(0.067)
Constantst ,Dependent Var.(-1)st , Reg_Elecst , Jud_Elecst ,
Jud_Elecst .cst , cst , Budgetst , Employst , Resst , Indst , Youngst ,
Gen_Fuelst , Gen_Nuclst , Popst , (Popst)2 , Incomest , (Incomest)2 ,
Salesst .

Additional
Av_Majst ,Av_Majst*Repst , Repst .
Instruments
Arellano-Bond estimator for dynamic panel.
Estimation
0.98
0.99
0.99
Ov-Id Test (P-Value)
1274
1274
1274
N. of Obs.
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;
3. One-step results employed for inference on coefficients.
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